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NOTES 
Black Identity and Child Placement: The Best Interests of 
Black and Biracial Children 
Kim Forde-Mazrui 
INTRODUCTION 
Transracial adoption 1 increased sharply in the 1950s and 1960s.2 
Many factors converged to cause this increase, 3 including a rise in the 
number of children in the placement system4 and an insufficient 
number of minority homes in which to place minority children. 5 Be-
ginning in 1972, however, transracial adoptions were drastically cur-
tailed in favor of racial matching. 6 This reversal was caused in large 
part by the National Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW), 
which came out strongly against transracial adoption.7 The organiza-
tion's 1972 position paper stated: 
1. This Note uses the term transracial adoption to refer to adoptions of Black children by 
white parents. See infra note 9 for an explanation for the capitalization of the term Black 
2. Margaret Howard, Transracial Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 59 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 505-16 (1984); see also infra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. The 
number oftransracial adoptions tripled between 1968 and 1971. Twila L. Perry, Race and Child 
Placement: The Best Interests Test and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 109 n.199 (1991). 
3. Professor Howard identifies seven factors contributing to the rise in transracial placement: 
(1) a rise in the number of children entering the child-placement system due to increased aware-
ness and reporting of child abuse, Howard, supra note 2, at 505; (2) a growing awareness of foster 
care deficiencies, id. at 505-06; (3) empirical data revealing the dangers of maternal and stable-
family deprivation, id. at 506-09; (4) a dramatic decline of healthy white infants available for 
adoption, id. at 509-10; (5) a reduced adherence to the policy of "matching" children with adop-
tive parents to whom they might have been born, id. at 510-13; (6) an insufficient number of 
minority homes available for minority children, id. at 513-14; and (7) an increasing societal 
acceptance of integration, which contributed to willingness of white parents to adopt Black chil-
dren. Id. at 514-16. 
4. Id. at 505. 
5. Id. at 513-14. 
6. Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in 
Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1179 (1991) ("In 1972 this brief era of relative openness 
came to an abrupt end."). In this Note, racial matching refers to the practice of preferring to 
place Black children with Black parents rather than white parents. Racial matching may result 
in avoiding placement with white parents even when Black parents are not immediately 
available. 
7. Id. at 1181 ("Adoption agency bureaucrats moved swiftly to accommodate the position 
taken by the NABSW."). Howard writes, "[i]n 1972 the National Association of Black Social 
Workers (NABSW) condemned transracial adoption in terms so militant that transracial adop-
tion fell by 39 percent in a single year." Howard, supra note 2, at 517. The NABSW's position 
against transracial adoption contributed significantly to the decline of the practice. James S. 
Bowen, Cultural Convergences and Divergences: The Nexus Between Putative Afro-American 
Family Values and the Best Interests of the Child, 26 J. FAM. L. 487, 502 (1988). 
925 
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The National Association of Black Social Workers has taken a vehe-
ment stand against the placement of Black children in white homes for 
any reason. We affirm the inviolable position of Black children in Black 
families where they belong physically, psychologically and culturally in 
order that they receive the total sense of themselves and develop a sound 
projection of their future . 
. . . Black children in white homes are cut off from the healthy devel-
opment of themselves as Black people, which development is the normal 
expectation and only true humanistic goal. 
Identity grows on the three levels of all human development; the 
physical, psychological and cultural and the nurturing of self identity is a 
prime function of the family. The incongruence of a white family per-
forming this function for a Black child is easily recognized. The physical 
factor stands to maintain that child's difference from his family. There is 
no chance of his resembling any relative. One's physical identity with 
his own is of great significance. . . . 
... In our society, the developmental needs of Black children are 
significantly different from those of white children. Black children are 
taught, from an early age, highly sophisticated coping techniques to deal 
with racist practices perpetrated by individuals and institutions .... Only 
a Black family can transmit the emotional and sensitive subtleties of per-
ception and reaction essential for a Black child's survival in a racist soci-
ety. Our society is distinctly black or white and characterized by white 
racism at every level. We repudiate the fallacious and fantasied reason-
ing of some that whites adopting Black children will alter that basic 
character. 8 
The NABSW advances two arguments for the position that trans-
racial placement is contrary to a Black9 child's interests. First, it ar-
gues that a Black child needs to be raised by Black parents in order to 
develop a positive racial identity.10 Second, the NABSW argues that a 
8. NATIONAL AssN. OF BLACK SOCIAL WORKERS, POSITION PAPER (Summer 1973) [herein· 
after POSITION PAPER I]. 
9. This Note capitalizes the term Black when referring broadly to people classified as Black 
in the United States, including biracial children and people with any Black ancestry. See infra 
note 169. This Note does not capitalize black when referring specifically to children born to two 
Black parents in order to distinguish them from biracial children. This distinction is necessary 
because racial-matching policies do not distinguish between black and biracial children; there· 
fore, when evaluating such policies, one should use the same racial referent. When, however, this 
Note specifically addresses the placement of children born to one white parent and one Black 
parent, these biracial children are distinguished from black children born to two Black parents. 
For other articles capitalizing the term Black, see Bowen, supra note 7; Kimberle W. Crenshaw, 
Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimi11ation Law, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 1332 n.2 (1988) ("Blacks like Asians, Latinos, and other 'minorities,' consti· 
tute a specific cultural group and [thus] require denotation as a proper noun."); John D. 
Gregory, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction over No11crimi11al Misbehavior: The Argume/lt Against Abo-
lition, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 242, 266 (1978); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, 
and the State: All Agenda for Theory, in 7 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & Socv. 515, 516 
(1982); Perry, supra note 2, at 52 n.6. 
10. POSITION p APER I, supra note 8. 
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Black child needs Black parents in order to develop skills for coping 
with a racist society. 11 The NABSW argues that, because of these 
concerns, transracial adoption should be abolished.12 Other, less ada-
mant opponents of transracial placement would allow it in certain cir-
cumstances but argue that same-race placement should be favored. 13 
The NABSW also opposes placing biracial children with white 
parents. 14 The NABSW argues that society and those around such 
children will treat them as Black and, consequently, these children 
also need to identify positively as Black and cope with racial prejudice. 
Therefore, the NABSW concludes, when an adoption or custody pro-
ceeding concerns a biracial child, a court or adoption agency should 
favor placing the child with Black parents. The NABSW is not only 
concerned with the child's interest; it also argt!eS that transracial 
placement threatens the cultural interests of Black people as a group. 
The association claims that, by raising Black children to affiliate with 
the dominant culture, transracial placement removes these children 
from Black culture and dislocates them from the Black community. 
In this way, the NABSW argues, transracial placement constitutes 
"cultural genocide."ls 
Arguments such as those by the NABSW have influenced the prac-
tice of state adoption agencies and the reasoning of courts confronting 
the issue of race in child-placement decisions. 16 As a result, courts 
and adoption agencies often practice a policy of racial matching 
whereby they strive to place Black children with Black parents and 
11. Id.; Shari O'Brien, Race in Adoption Proceedings: The Pernicious Factor, 21 TULSA L.J. 
485, 494 (1986). 
12. See supra text accompanying note 8. 
13. E.g., Bowen, supra note 7, at 529, 533. Although he argues that race should always be a 
factor in child-placement determinations, id. at 522, Professor Bowen would favor transracial 
placement over lengthy institutional care, especially when the Black adoptee is older, disabled, or 
otherwise hard to place. Id. at 511. , 
Professor Twila Perry writes: 
To the extent that the NABSW would support keeping a child in an institution when a 
permanent home is available, or would support removal of a child from a home where she 
has formed strong bonds with her caretakers to place her in a home with adults of the same 
race, the position of that organization is too extreme. However, the view that emphasis 
should be placed on finding Black homes for Black children is proper and reasonable, and 
consistent with the view of other experts that where possible, Black children should be 
placed in Black homes. 
Perry, supra note 2, at 113-14. 
14. See Bowen, supra note 7, at 505 n.88. This Note uses the term biracial to refer to chil-
dren born to one white and one Black parent. See supra note 9 for an explanation of terminology 
and capitalization. 
15. Joan Mahoney, The Black Baby Doll: Transracial Adoption and Cultural Preservation, 59 
UMKC L. REV. 487, 501 n.85 (1991); see also JOYCE A. LADNER, MIXED FAMILIES: ADOPT-
ING ACROSS RACIAL BOUNDARIES 76-77 (Anchor Books 1978) (1977) ("Some supporters of the 
NABSW view transracial placement as a 'genocidal plot' designed to destroy the black race."). 
16. Professor Carl Schneider describes the NABSW's position as "another formulation of the 
[racial-matching] argument." Carl E. Schneider, Family Law ch.13 (1991) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author). Several courts have adopted this reasoning. The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, for example, in affirming the placement of a biracial child with Black foster par-
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discourage placement with white parents. Courts also practice racial 
matching in child custody disputes between parents, preferring to 
place the biracial child with the Black parent when the parents 
divorce. 17 
The purpose of this Note is to question whether racial matching by 
courts and child-placement agencies serves the best interests of Black 
children. The principle that guides this Note's analysis is that racial 
matching is justified only if such a policy better serves the interests of 
Black children than a policy in which race is not a factor in a child-
placement determination. This Note also questions whether racial 
matching serves the interests of biracial children and those of Black 
people as a cultural group. 
This Note does not focus on the equal protection concerns raised 
by the use of race in child placement. This is not to suggest that the 
Constitution is not implicated or important. Rather, by concentrating 
on the interests of Black children, this Note recognizes that, unless 
and until Congress18 or the Supreme Court19 forbids the consideration 
of race in child placement,20 many courts and agencies will continue to 
view the issue only with reference to the best-interests standard.21 
Part I of this Note examines caselaw regarding the permissible use 
of race in child custody and adoption proceedings and finds that many 
courts permit the consideration of race in placing a Black child. Part I 
ents instead of white grandparents, explicitly referred to the position of the National Association 
of Black Social Workers. In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614, 622 (Pa. 1983). 
Similarly, in In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 791 (D.C. 1982), the court stressed the importance 
of evaluating "how each family's race is likely to affect the child's development of a sense of 
identity, including racial identity." In defining identity, the court included "survival skills that 
enable the child to cope with the world outside the family." 454 A.2d at 787 (citation omitted). 
In Drummond v. Fulton County Dept. of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1205 (5th 
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978), the court referred generally to the professional 
literature as stressing the importance of having parents that could cope with problems of racial 
identity. 
17. See infra section l.C. 
18. Senators Carol Moseley-Braun (D-Ill.) and Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) have re-
cently introduced a bill that would prohibit any agency receiving federal funds from denying or 
delaying the placement of a child on account of race, color, or national origin. See S.1224, 103d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Representative Luis V. Gutierrez (D-111.) has introduced a similar bill in 
the House that would prohibit delay or denial of placement on such grounds only if a "match-
ing" parent is not available. See H.R. 3307, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The NABSW has also 
advocated enactment of "National Black Heritage Child Welfare Act," which would mandate 
preferences for placing minority children in minority homes. Bartholet, supra note 6, at 1182 
n.43 (citing NATL. ASSN. OF BLACK Soc. WORKERS, INC., PRESERVING BLACK FAMILIES: RE-
SEARCH AND ACTION BEYOND THE RHETORIC 49 (1986)). 
19. Arguably, the Court has forbidden the use of race in child placement. See Palmore v. 
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), discussed infra notes 24-36 and accompanying text. Read narrowly, 
however, Palmore only forbids a court from removing a child from her biological parent solely 
because of the risks of societal hostility to the parent's interracial marriage. See infra section I.A. 
20. The term child placement refers to adoption proceedings and child custody 
determinations. 
21. See infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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further finds that courts and agencies view a biracial child as Black 
and, consequently, favor placing a biracial child with her Black parent 
after a custody dispute and with Black parents in the adoption con-
text. Part II considers various ways in which the use of race in the 
placement process harms Black children. Part II concludes that, even 
assuming that transracial placement entails risks, the harms of racial 
matching - both in the adoption and custody context - counsel 
against race-conscious placement. Part III evaluates the assumptions 
underlying the NABSW's position against transracial placement. It 
first considers the interests of Black children generally and concludes 
that not only is there insufficient evidence that transracial placement 
harms Black children, but transracial placement may also carry its 
own benefits over inracial placement. Part III then focuses on biracial 
children and finds that additional reasons support the abandonment of 
Black-preferred placement for these children. Finally, Part III consid-
ers the interests of Black people as a group. Contrary to the position 
of NABSW, this Part argues that transracial placement does not 
threaten Black culture and may in fact contribute to Black culture's 
ability to survive and adapt. 
This Note concludes that, in light of the harm caused by racial 
matching and the benefits offered by transracial placement, the use of 
race in the child-placement process is not justified. Courts and agen-
cies should instead limit child-placement determinations to nonracial 
criteria. Alternatively, if courts or agencies insist on considering race, 
the perceived risks involved in transracial placement, the costs of ra-
cial matching, and the benefits of transracial placement should inform 
their decisions. 
I. CASELA W CONCERNING RACE IN CHILD CUSTODY 
AND ADOPTION 
When considering the placement of a child, the states generally 
charge courts with protecting the best interests of the child. 22 The 1 
courts have great discretion over the factors to consider and the 
weight to attribute to each.23 Many courts consider race when placing 
22. For a list of state child-placement statutes setting forth the best-interests standard and 
the criteria by which courts should apply it, see Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudica-
tion: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 
1975, at 226, 236-37 nn.45-47; see also Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433 ("In common with most states, 
Florida law mandates that custody determinations be made in the best interests of the children 
involved.") (citation omitted); Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264, 267 (E.D. La. 1972) 
("In all jurisdictions the welfare and best interests of the child are paramount in both adoption 
and custody proceedings."); cf. Bartholet, supra note 6, at 1237 ("Adoption laws throughout this 
country provide that agencies are to make children's interests paramount in placement 
decisions."). 
23. See Mnookin, supra note 22, at 233. Factors relevant to a child's best interests include 
the need for a permanent home, continuity of relationships, Perry, supra note 2, at 84, and the 
ability of the parents to provide care and education. In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 794 (D.C. 
1982) (Mack, J., concurring). 
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a child. The issue of race in child placement arises primarily in three 
situations: (1) when a divorced parent sues to gain custody because the 
custodial parent remarries interracially; (2) when parents of different 
races both seek custody following divorce; and (3) when a Black child 
is placed for adoption. 
This Part examines caselaw regarding the permissible use of race in 
these child custody and adoption proceedings. It does not attempt to 
review all available caselaw, but only to illustrate a typical approach 
taken by courts that engage in racial matching. Section I.A considers 
the issue of race in custody-modification proceedings based on the in-
terracial remarriage of a white child's custodial parent. Although this 
type of case is not the focus of this Note, it is the only context in which 
the Supreme Court has considered the use of race in child placement. 
This section concludes that the Supreme Court's holding in Palmore v. 
Sidoti, 24 while limiting the use of race in custody modifications, did 
not clearly foreclose its consideration in such proceedings. Moreover, 
Palmore has left unresolved the issue of race in adoption and custody 
determinations other than when a white parent remarries interracially. 
Section l.B examines cases involving Black children in the adop-
tion context and concludes that, while race may not be the sole or 
controlling placement factor, many jurisdictions allow or require 
courts and agencies to consider race when placing Black children. 
Section I.C looks specifically at custody and adoption cases involving 
biracial children. It concludes that most courts addressing the place-
ment of biracial children find that such children should be placed with 
Black parents. 
A. Custody Modification Based on the Interracial Remarriage of 
the Custodia/ Parent 
The Supreme Court addressed the use of race in child placement in 
Palmore v. Sidoti. 25 Melanie Sidoti, a three-year-old white girl, was 
placed with her mother when her white parents divorced in 1980.26 
Subsequently, Melanie and her mother began to live with a Black man 
whom her mother eventually married.27 Sixteen months following 
Melanie's placement with her mother, her father sought a change of 
custody based on "changed conditions."28 In particular, her father 
24. 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
25. 466 U.S. at 429. 
26. 466 U.S. at 430. 
27. 466 U.S. at 430. 
28. 466 U.S. at 430. As one commentator states: 
Although the standard for modifying custody varies from state to state, the most common 
standard is a substantial change of circumstances, coupled with a showing that the best 
interest of the child will be served by the modification. The substantial change usually must 
be with the custodial parent or the child; a change of circumstance of the noncustodial 
parent is not enough by itself to warrant modification. 
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objected to the interracial marriage of Melanie's mother.29 The 
Florida trial court entered an order transferring custody of the child to 
the father. The trial court relied exclusively on the interracial mar-
riage, 30 which, that court concluded, would subject the child to racial 
hostility.31 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Writing for a unanimous 
Court, Chief Justice Burger recognized the importance of protecting 
the best interests of the child. 32 He further acknowledged that 
"[t]here is a risk that a child living with a stepparent of a different race 
may be subject to a variety of pressures and stresses not present if the 
child were living with parents of the same racial or ethnic origin."33 
Nonetheless, the Court stated, equal protection forbids a court from 
considering "the reality of private biases and the possible injury they 
might inflict" in removing a child from the custody of her biological 
parent. 34 Therefore, the Court held, Melanie should have remained 
with her mother. 
Palmore seemingly made clear that courts may not base custody 
decisions on the existence of an interracial marriage. 35 Read nar-
Jeff Atkinson, It All Comes Down to the Best Interest of the Child, FAM. Aovoc., Winter 1990, at 
34, 35; see, e.g., Boone v. Boone, 565 P.2d 337, 338 (N.M. 1977) (stating that a party seeking 
change of custody must prove a material change in circumstances). 
29. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 430-31. 
30. The court order stated that " 'there is no issue as to either party's devotion to the child, 
adequacy of housing facilities, or respectability of the new spouse of either parent.' " 466 U.S. at 
432 (citation omitted). It is clear, wrote Chief Justice Burger, that the trial court's decision 
"would have been different had petitioner married a Caucasian male of similar respectability." 
466 U.S. at 432. 
31. 466 U.S. at 431. The Florida appellate court had affirmed the trial court order without 
opinion. Palmore v. Sidoti, 426 So. 2d 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). 
32. "The State, of course, has a duty of the highest order to protect the interests of minor 
children, particularly those of tender years .... The goal of granting custody based on the best 
interests of the child is indisputably a substantial governmental interest .... " 466 U.S. at 433. 
33. 466 U.S. at 433. 
34. 466 U.S. at 433. 
35. Before Palmore, several courts, on their own initiative, refused to modify custody because 
of the interracial remarriage of the custodial parent. See, e.g., DeLander v. DeLander, 37 
U.S.L.W. 2139 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 1968) (stating that an interracial relationship in and of 
itself is irrelevant); In re Marriage of Kramer, 297 N.W.2d 359, 362 (Iowa 1980) (stating that the 
only relevance an interracial relationship might have is possible harmful effects on the emotional 
welfare of children, but finding that race in this case had no bearing on that issue); Edel v. Edel, 
293 N.W.2d 792, 796 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the trial judge committed error in 
determining child custody in a divorce case by considering the mother's association with a person 
of a different race); Boone v. Boone, 565 P.2d 337, 339 (N.M. 1977) (holding race alone cannot 
form the basis of a custody modification); Pennsylvania ex rel. Myers v. Myers, 360 A.2d 587 
(Pa. 1976) (stating that a nonmarital relationship of the mother, irrespective of race of her par-
amour, is irrelevant absent a showing that the relationship adversely affected the children; stating 
that problems related to racial identity are inapplicable in custody proceedings); Commonwealth 
ex rel. Lucas v. Kreischer, 299 A.2d 243 (Pa. 1973) (stating that the interracial marriage of the 
mother does not warrant denial of custody when no evidence is presented that the children would 
suffer); 111 re Custody of Temos, 450 A.2d 111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (stating that race is not a 
consideration, concern, or factor). 
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rowly, however, the Court's holding - that race may not be the sole 
factor in a decision to remove a child from her natural mother36 -
does not clarify whether race can play a role in some child-placement 
contexts. For example, the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Holt v. 
Chenault 37 held that, although the trial court may not consider socie-
tal hostility toward a white mother's interracial remarriage, the 
"child's emotional reaction to her mother's marital circumstances may 
enter into deciding what is in the best interest of the child."38 Thus 
the decision in Palmore did not clearly forbid the consideration of a 
parent's interracial remarriage when the child, rather than the com-
munity at large, objects to the marriage. In other child-placement 
contexts, such as adoption proceedings and custody disputes between 
parents of different races - contexts in which additional issues of the 
child's racial identity and coping skills arise - Palmore provides even 
less guidance. 
B. Black Children and Transracial Adoption 
The question of race also arises when agencies and courts place 
Black children for adoption. This section illustrates the approaches 
some courts have taken in deciding how much weight to place on race 
in a best-interests determination.39 The cases demonstrate that, while 
courts differ in their approach to the proper role of race in adoption 
proceedings, many courts permit the consideration of race.40 
The use of race by state agencies and courts when placing a child 
raises questions concerning the rights of the children and prospective 
adoptive parents under the Equal Protection Clause.41 In re R.M. G. 42 
illustrates two approaches to addressing these concerns. A one-judge 
plurality held that consideration of race in adoption is subject to strict 
scrutiny; courts and agencies can only consider race if necessary to 
achieve a compelling government interest. In this case, a white foster 
couple raised a Black child for the first three years of her life. When 
the foster parents sought to adopt the child, the Black paternal grand-
mother challenged the adoption by claiming that, because the child 
was Black, she should be placed with her. The trial court removed the 
child from her home and placed her with the grandmother. The ap-
36. 466 U.S. at 432, 434. 
37. 722 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1987). 
38. 722 S.W.2d at 898 (emphasis added). 
39. Cases involving biracial children are included in this section because the courts' reason-
ing applies to Black children generally. The next section deals more specifically with biracial 
children in the context of custody disputes. 
40. For a collection of such cases, see Perry, supra note 2, at SS n.8 (citing cases); see also 
DeWees v. Stevenson, 779 F. Supp. 2S, 28 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Gloria G. v. State Dept. of Social & 
Rehabilitation Servs., 833 P.2d 979, 986 (Kan. 1992). 
41. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. 
42. 454 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982). 
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pellate court accepted the trial court's policy of preferring to match 
children with families of the same race. In looking out for the best 
interests of the child, the court held that race could have a determina-
tive impact on child placement.4 3 
Tlie concurring judge presented an alternative view that "s[ aw] no 
need to reach the constitutional issue of equal protection."44 "We are 
... not faced with a statutory scheme separating persons solely on the 
basis of racial classifications or an affirmative action program allegedly 
giving preference on the basis of racial classifications. "45 He argued 
that a court does not infringe upon equal protection concerns when it 
considers race simply as one of many factors that bear on the child's 
best interests. He criticized the plurality and dissent's debate over the 
appropriate constitutional scrutiny, observing that, "[ w ]hile my col-
leagues are quibbling about 'strict scrutiny' and 'intermediate scru-
tiny,' a little girl is reaching school age under the care of the only 
parents she has eve[r] known."46 
While permitting the use of race in child placement, courts have 
ruled that race may not be the sole factor in placing a child for adop-
tion. For example, the court in Compos v. McKeithen 47 invalidated a 
state statute that categorically prohibited transracial adoption. 48 
Finding such a racial classification "constitu~ionally suspect,'' the 
court invalidated the law under the Equal Protection Clause, 49 deter-
mining that no permissible state objective existed because foster care 
or institutional life is not always preferable to transracial placement. 50 
In dicta, the court left open a limited use of race. The court regarded 
"the difficulties inherent in interracial adoption as justifying considera-
tion of race as a relevant factor in adoption, [but] not as justifying race 
as the determinative factor." 51 
The Fifth Circuit in Drummond v. Fulton County Department of 
Family & Children's Services 52 also held that race cannot be determi-
native in the sense, as the Compos court seemed to say, that race can-
not serve to deny a transracial placement automatically. The 
Drummond court did, however, permit race to determine a placement 
43. 454 A.2d at 791-92. The court did state, however, that race should be a determinative 
factor only when opposite race families are unable to provide the child with a sense of identity. 
44. 454 A.2d at 794 (Mack, J., concurring). 
45. 454 A.2d at 794-95 (Mack, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
46. 454 A.2d at 795 (Mack, J., concurring). 
47. 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972). 
48. The statute read: "A single person over the age of twenty-one years, or a married couple 
jointly, may petition to adopt any child of his or their race." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:422 
(1950), cited in Compos, 341 F. Supp. at 264. 
49. 341 F. Supp. at 266, 268. 
50. 341 F. Supp. at 266, 268. 
51. 341 F. Supp. at 266. 
52. 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978). 
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in the sense that, but for consideration of race, the placement would 
have been different. Timmy, a biracial child,53 was placed with Robert 
and Mildred Drummond, a white foster couple, when he was one 
month old. Within a year, the Drummonds applied to adopt Timmy. 
The agency resisted. After Timmy had been in the Drummond home 
for nearly two years, the agency denied the Drummonds' petition be-
cause, although they did not have a Black home in which to place 
Timmy, they intended to find a Black home for him. The Drummonds 
brought suit alleging, in part, that the agency's consideration of race 
denied both Timmy and them equal protection. Although it found the 
Drummonds qualified in other respects, the trial court refused to en-
join the agency from removing Timmy from the Drummonds. 
Sitting en bane, the Fifth Circuit upheld the trial court's decision 
to give substantial weight to race in removing Timmy. Because of the 
" 'difficulties inherent in interracial adoption,' " the court allowed the 
use of race to "avoid[ ] the potentially tragic possibility of placing a 
child in a home with parents who will not be able to cope with the 
child's problems."54 In fact, the court held, race can be decisive "if it 
is the factor which tips the balance between two potential families, 
where it is not used automatically."55 Thus, race can be the deciding 
factor in a close case. 
C. Biracial Children and Custodial Placement 
The issue of race also arises in custody disputes between the par-
ents of a biracial child. Despite the historical hostility in the United 
States toward interracial marriages, 56 their frequency is increasing. 57 
Consequently, the number of biracial children is also increasing.58 As 
these children become the subject of custody and adoption proceed-
ings, the issue of race presents itself more frequently. Courts must 
decide not only whether to consider race, but also which race to label 
the biracial child. Courts that have confronted this issue often con-
53. Except for a passing observation that, "as Timmy grew older he would retain the charac· 
teristics of his black father," 563 F.2d at 1204, the court approached the case as one concerning 
the placement of a black child. See supra note 39. 
54. 563 F.2d at 1205. 
55. 563 F.2d at 1205. 
56. Until the 1960s, several states had laws prohibiting interracial marriages. See Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 6 n.5 (1967) (citing statutes of 15 states); see generally Walter Wadlington, 
The Loving Case: Virginia's Anti-Miscegenation Statute in Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 
1189 (1966) (discussing the development of antimiscegenation statutes in Virginia). In Loving. 
the Supreme Court of the United States declared laws prohibiting interracial marriages unconsti· 
tutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
57. The number of black-white interracial marriages increased from 65,000 in 1970 to 
167,000 in 1980 to 218,000 in 1988. See Perry, supra note 2, at 52 n.4. 
58. One author asserts that, in 1984, there were approximately one million mixed-race chil· 
dren. Kathi Overmier, Biracial Adolescents: Areas of Conflict in ldelltity Formation, 14 J. 
APPLIED Soc. Sci. 157, 158 (1990). 
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elude that a biracial child is better placed with Black parents. 59 
An early case that addressed a biracial custody dispute is Ward v. 
Ward. 60 The Ward court granted custody of biracial daughters to 
their Black father instead of their white mother. The court stated that 
"[t]hese unfortunate girls, through no fault of their own, are the vic-
tims of a mixed marriage and a broken home. They will have a better 
opportunity to take their rightful place in society if they are brought 
up among their own people. "61 Evidently, the court considered the bi-
racial children's "own people" to be Black. 62 
While Ward may be outdated in its language, 63 courts and place-
ment agencies continue to subscribe to its assumption that courts 
should treat biracial children as Black. Farmer v. Farmer, 64 for exam-
ple, involved a custody dispute between a white mother and a Black 
father. Although, due to other factors, the court granted custody to 
the white mother, it did consider the biracial heritage of the child. 
The court stated that "[a]ll agreed that the child of this interracial 
union, with evident black physical characteristics, however subtle, will 
be perceived by society at large as a black child. Such a child can be 
expected to endure identity problems, which can be exacerbated in her 
because of the mixed racial heritage."65 The court concluded that a 
Black parent would better understand the identity problems of a bi-
racial child than a white parent. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in In re Davis, 66 actually held 
that the trial court erred by not taking race into account. In this case, 
white maternal grandparents sought custody of their biracial 
grandchild. The trial court awarded custody to Black foster parents 
primarily because they also had custody of the child's siblings. In re-
viewing the trial court testimony, the appellate court found that others 
would perceive the biracial child as Black and therefore the child 
should be placed in the Black foster home. The court held erroneous 
the trial ·court's failure to consider the harmful consequences of plac-
59. See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton County Dept. of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 
1200 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); Fountaine v. Fountaine, 133 N.E.2d 532 
(Ill. 1956); Farmer v. Farmer, 439 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Ward v. Ward, 216 P.2d 755 
(Wash. 1950); see also Perry, supra note 2, at 65 ("[S]ome courts automatically assumed it would 
be proper for [biracial] children, who would be defined by the society as Black, to be raised by the 
Black parent."). 
60. 216 P.2d 755 (Wash. 1950). 
61. 216 P.2d at 756 (emphasis added). 
62. Without explanation, the court concluded that children of the mixed marriage are Black. 
"He is colored; she is white .... Both children are colored." 216 P.2d at 755. 
63. Ward was repudiated by the Washington Court of Appeals in Tucker v. Tucker, 542 P.2d 
789 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975). 
64. 439 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. 1981). 
65. 439 N.Y.S.2d at 586. 
66. 465 A.2d 614 (Pa. 1983). 
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ing the "black" child with white custodians. 67 
When confronted with the placement of black or biracial children, 
many courts permit consideration of race to a certain degree. They 
intend these racial-matching policies to serve the best interests of the 
children. The next Part of this Note argues, however, that such poli-
cies injure the very children they are designed to protect. 
II. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COSTS OF CONSIDERING RACE IN THE 
CHILD-PLACEMENT PROCESS 
This Part examines the psychological costs to individual Black 
children when courts and agencies practice racial matching. The 
child-placement process consists of two dependent stages: the stage 
during which state adoption agencies alone handle the process and the 
stage during which parties request the courts to intervene. For cus-
tody disputes between divorcing parents, the judicial process usually 
represents the only stage in the placement process. Section II.A con-
siders the initial stage, which only involves adoption agencies and pro-
spective adoptive parents. Racial-matching policies at this stage cause 
unnecessary delays in placing black and biracial children in permanent 
homes, and these delays, as a consequence, seriously decrease the chil-
dren's chances of permanent placement. In addition, adoption agen-
cies may take these children from white foster parents, who have cared 
for the children for months or years, in order to prevent the white 
parents from adopting them. 
Section II.B considers the costs of racial matching in judicial pro-
ceedings concerning adoption and custody. Considering race causes 
two problems. First, courts tend to overemphasize the importance of 
race. Although courts profess to treat race as only one of many fac-
tors influencing their decisions, they often rely on race as the primary 
or dispositive basis for placement decisions. Second, by including race 
in a best-interests proceeding, courts encourage litigation over the is-
sue of how the court should consider race. While litigation generally 
can be traumatic for children, litigation over racial identity particu-
larly threatens the welfare of Black children. This Part concludes 
that, even if Black children derive some benefit from having courts and 
agencies take race into account, the attendant costs of the process to 
the children involved supports the exclusion of race as a placement 
consideration. 
A. Racial Matching by Adoption Agencies 
Professor Elizabeth Bartholet has conducted extensive research 
into the prevailing practices of adoption agencies responsible for plac-
67. Because the trial court had granted custody to the Black foster parents, the state supreme 
court found the error to be harmless. 
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ing Black children. 68 Adoption agencies, according to Bartholet, typi-
cally practice racial-matching policies. 69 These policies cause delays 
in permanent placement. 70 Because Black children represent a dispro-
portionately high number of children in need of homes, 71 they wait up 
to twice as long for permanent homes as white children wait. 72 In 
addition, a higher proportion of Black children are never placed. 73 An 
insufficient number of Black families are available for these waiting 
Black children, while many white families are available to adopt 
them.74 
By avoiding placement with white parents, racial-matching poli-
cies cause and exacerbate delays in the placement of Black children. 75 
As Bartholet observes, if no same-race family is available, adoption 
agencies "typically ... hold[ ] black children in foster or institutional 
care for significant periods of time after they are or could be free for 
adoption."76 Adoption agencies often resist transracial placement due 
to procedural disincentives and political pressure, 77 even after man-
dated waiting periods for finding Black homes have expired. 78 Indeed, 
in many agencies, policies against transracial placement are virtually 
68. For a full account of her research and findings, see Bartholet, supra note 6, at 1163-256. 
69. Id. at 1183-200. 
70. Id. at 1201-07. 
71. Although Black people and people of color represent approximately 12.3% and 17% of 
the total population, Black children and children of color represent an estimated one-third 
(34.1%) and one half(47.5%) of children waiting for homes. Id. at 1187 n.61, 1201-02 n.99. 
72. "A recent study found that minority children waited for an average of two years, com-
pared to an average one year wait for non-minorities." Id. at 1201; :s-ee also id. at 1201 n.102. 
73. The placement rates of Black children are 20% lower than those of their white counter-
parts. Id. at 1201. 
74. Id. at 1202 n.103, 1203. One study by the Child Welfare League found a large number of 
minority children waiting long periods for placement, a large number of white parents waiting to 
adopt, and a limited number of minority parents applying to adopt. Id. at 1202 n.103. But see 
NATIONAL AssN. OF BLACK SOCIAL WORKERS, POSITION PAPER ON TRANSRACIAL PLACE-
MENTS (1986) (arguing that the historic scarcity of Black adoptive parents stems from the failure 
of the child welfare system to recruit Black families). Whether sufficient Black families could be 
found is dubious. See Howard, supra note 2, at 513-14; supra note 72. Even if Black homes 
could be found with special efforts, the question remains whether such efforts involving expendi-
tures of limited resources are necessary for the interests of Black children. 
75. "Informed observers of the adoption scene - people who know the [racial-matching] 
policies and see them in operation - believe there is a strong causal connection between the 
policies and the delays and denial of placement that minority children face." Bartholet, supra 
note 6, at 1202 n.103. But see id. at 1201 n.102. 
76. Id. at 1193. 
77. Social workers are often required to document efforts to find Black homes before approv-
ing a white adoption. In addition, a social worker who approves a transracial placement may 
incur harsh criticism from the NABSW and other transracial adoption critics. Consequently, 
"[t]he overburdened and underpaid adoption worker has every incentive to avoid the multiple 
troubles promised by transracial placement." Id. at 1195 (noting that the attitudes of white 
adoption professionals toward transracial placement have been affected by the perceived "risks of 
punishment"). 
78. Agency policies often specify time periods, ranging from three to 18 months, before the 
agencies can consider transracial placement. Id. at 1193. 
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absolute. 79 Racial-matching policies especially delay the placement of 
Black children with special needs, including those who are older, dis-
abled, or otherwise difficult to place. 80 In some cases, delays result in 
the denial of placement altogether. 8 1 
When agencies delay or deny permanent placement, children 
suffer: 
The ravaging consequences of both institutionalization and succes-
sive foster care placements are well documented. A child deprived of an 
ongoing, stable relationship with a psychological parent is likely to lack 
the capacity to form deep emotional attachments or warm social rela-
tionships, and may well encounter difficulties functioning intellectually 
and maintaining physical stamina. 82 
Thus, while the risks of transracial adoptions are largely speculative,83 
the costs of racial-matching policies - for the children they are in-
tended to help - are real. Despite these children's urgent need for a 
home, adoption agencies prolong the wait in an attempt to find Black 
homes. Unfortunately, as one commentator notes, "[a] child who 
must forego parents, whatever their color, is victimized, not benefitted, 
by well-intentioned but misdirected attempts to promote racial 
pride. " 84 Given these costs, agencies should abandon such attempts 
unless clearly warranted. 85 
B. Racial Matching in the Judicial Process 
This section considers the psychological costs to black and biracial 
children when the judiciary, as opposed to agencies, engages in racial 
matching. Section J:I.B.1 argues that courts tend to place more em-
phasis on race than the law purportedly permits. By overemphasizing 
race, a court's decision fails to consider adequately other important 
79. Id. at 1195; Mahoney, supra note 15, at 497 ("In practice, it appears that either the due 
consideration given to race or the priority for same race placements preclude[s] transracial adop-
tions .... "). 
80. Hard-to-place children include older children, children with severe disabilities, and chil· 
dren with emotional problems resulting from abuse or successive foster care placement. Agen-
cies often rebuff white parents seeking to adopt such children because the agencies consider 
transracial placement only as a last resort, even for these children. Bartholet, supra note 6, at 
1204 & n.111. 
81. While the months and years go by the children are pushed deeper into the hard-to-
place category, as they get older and accumulate what are often damaging experiences in 
foster care. Delay thus puts the child at risk of yet more delay and, ultimately, the denial of 
placement altogether. 
Id. at 1204. 
82. O'Brien, supra note 11, at 492. Professor Howard writes, "[t]he weight of current opin-
ion is that a stable family may be the single most important factor in children's healthy emotional 
development." Howard, supra note 2, at 508 (footnote omitted). 
83. See infra Part III. 
84. O'Brien, supra note 11, at 494-95. 
85. Part III infra argues that these attempts to avoid transracial placement are unwarranted 
and should be abandoned. 
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factors relating to the child's best interests. Section 11.B.2 argues that 
the courts' willingness to consider race tends to encourage harmful 
litigation over a child's placement and her racial identity. 
1. Judicial Overemphasis of Race 
Courts that consider race in child-placement proceedings generally 
hold that race may be one of many factors forming the basis of a place-
ment decision.86 Often, however, race becomes the primary factor on 
which a court bases its decision. 87 Several reasons may explain the 
excessive weight courts give to race in child-placement proceedings. 88 
One explanation stems from the subjective and discretionary nature of 
the best-interests standard. 89 Naturally, a judge will have personal 
views, biases, or prejudices regarding a historically controversial issue 
such as race.90 By leaving the use of race and its relative weight to the 
discretion of the court, the best-interests standard allows the judge's 
own personal and cultural biases to influence her decision.91 In addi-
tion, judges may lack sufficient training to determine a child's best 
interests and, especially, to evaluate the risks posed by transracial 
placement.92 Assessing a child's needs and predicting a child's future 
are difficult tasks for professionals trained in childhood development, 
86. See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton County Dept. of Family & Children's Services, 563 F.2d 
1200, 1211 (5th Cir. 1977) ("[R]ace may be considered as 'a' factor in adoptions."), cert. denied, 
437 U.S. 910 (1978); Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264, 266 (E.D. La. 1972) (stating that 
race is a relevant factor but cannot be determinative); In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 802 (D.C. 
1982); In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614, 622 (Pa. 1983) ("[T]he respective races of the participants is a 
factor to be considered in a child's placement determination but, as with all factors, can be no 
more than that - a factor."); see also supra section l.B. 
87. See Noel Myricks & Donna L. Ferullo, Race and Child-Custody Disputes, 35 FAM. REL. 
325, 325 (1986); O'Brien, supra note 11, at 487; Perry, supra note 2, at 57 ("Although the [best-
interests] rule is intended to be a multi-factor balancing test, it may often allow race inappropri-
ately to achieve a dominant position."). 
88. One writer identifies three special problems that judges have in deciding custody cases: 
the vagueness and Jack of guidance provided by most child-placement statutes; the human frailty 
of judges, who often fall prey to their personal "value systems, cultural biases and stereotypical 
beliefs"; and, finally, "the fact that judges are not trained to understand and analyze human 
psychological behavior." Colleen McKinley, Note, Custody Disputes Following the Dissolution of 
Interracial Marriages: Best Interests of the Child or Judicial Racism?, 19 J. FAM. L. 97, 122 
(1980). 
89. Perry, supra note 2, at 59-60 ("Where courts have broad discretion to consider race 
under the best interests standard, it can easily become the dominant concern ... . ");see also 
David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. 
L. REV. 477, 481 (1984) (arguing that open and flexible judicial standards result in arbitrary and 
overreaching decisions). 
90. For example, in 1977, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania censured Judge William F. 
Potter for his remarks about the adoption of biracial children. Judge Potter was reported to have 
said: "It's great when they're little pic[k]aninnies; they're very cute and everybody's a do-gooder. 
But what about when they're older? When they're 14 or IS? I don't think its proper." In re 
Potter, No. 82 (unpublished order, Pa. 1977), cited in Talbot D'Alemberte, Searching for the 
Limits of Judicial Free Speech, 61 TuL. L. REV. 611, 631 n.ll7 (1987). 
91. McKinley, supra note 88, at 122; Perry, supra note 2, at 60. 
92. See McKinley, supra note 88, at 122. 
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let alone a judge trained primarily in law. Race may provide judges 
with a convenient way to avoid a careful best-interests analysis. 
Whatever the reason, when courts consider race, they often ignore 
other important factors and thereby risk deciding cases contrary to the 
welfare of the child. 93 
A court's focus on race in McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 94 for example, 
caused Raymond, a two-and-one-half-year-old Black boy, to suffer 
deep clinical depression. An adoption agency removed Raymond 
from his white foster parents with whom he had lived for two years. 
Raymond was transferred to a Black foster family. After the removal, 
Raymond fell into severe depression resulting from the disruption of 
his relationship with his white foster parents. A federal district court 
returned the child to the foster parents because it found that the state 
court had impermissibly removed Raymond solely on the basis of race. 
Recall also the Drummond 95 case, in which the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed an agency's removal of Timmy, a two-year-old biracial child, 
from the home of the Drummonds, a white foster couple with whom 
Timmy had lived since he was one month old. Despite the trial court's 
findings that the Drummonds were qualified in all respects except 
race, that the Drummonds had cared for Timmy for two years, and 
that the agency had no Black home in which to place Timmy, the 
Fifth Circuit upheld the removal of Timmy on the basis of race in 
order to "avoid[ ] the potentially tragic possibility of placing a child in 
a home with parents who will not be able to cope with the child's 
problems."96 The real tragedy, however, is that Timmy lost the only 
parents he ever knew and has since been placed in one foster home 
after another.97 
The New Mexico Supreme Court, in contrast, reversed a trial 
court decision that impermissibly overemphasized race in refusing to 
place a white child with an interracial couple. In Boone v. Boone, 98 a 
white couple divorced, and the mother retained custody of the chil-
dren. The father sought custody on the ground that the mother was 
sexually involved with her fiancee, a Black man. The lower court 
granted the petition, finding that such a relationship "was immoral, a 
93. "In principle, the sole factor of race cannot be used to automatically disqualify petition· 
ers as adoptive parents .... But in practice, race alone can be dispositive when a court chooses 
to downplay or ignore other germane considerations, indulge in generalizations, or otherwise 
cover its tracks beneath an innocuous facade." O'Brien, supra note 11, at 487; see also Myricks 
& Ferullo, supra note 87, at 325; Perry, supra note 2, at 59-60. 
94. 693 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 
95. Drummond v. Fulton County Dept. of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200 (5th 
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978) (discussed supra in text accompanying notes 52-55). 
96. 563 F.2d at 1205. 
97. After Timmy's removal from the Drummonds, the agency eventually found a mixed-race 
foster couple with whom to place him. This placement proved unsuccessful, and Timmy was 
placed in yet another foster home. See O'Brien, supra note 11, at 489 n.18. 
98. 565 P.2d 337 (N.M. 1977). 
February 1994] Note - Child Placement 941 
bad influence on the children, and an improper atmosphere to raise 
minor children."99 Furthermore, the lower court continued, the chil-
dren would "be better reared with members of their own race." 100 
In reversing the lower court, the New Mexico Supreme Court 
found no evidence justifying a change of custody. A review of the 
record revealed undisputed evidence that the mother had provided the 
children with proper care. The children were well fed, well dressed, 
clean, and happy, and they had a good relationship with their Black 
stepfather. 101 By failing to consider these factors and relying on race 
alone, the lower court failed to protect the welfare of the children. 
The Supreme Court also found that the lower court impermissibly 
punished the mother for exercising her constitutional right to marry a 
person of another race.102 
A case decided in the District of Columbia illustrates how judges 
can implicitly overemphasize race in the face of other important fac-
tors. In In re R.M. G., 103 the trial court found the white foster parents 
and the Black grandmother to be comparably qualified to raise a Black 
girl 104 but granted custody to the grandmother because she was Black. 
Had race not been taken into account, however, it is difficult to explain 
how the trial court could have found the foster parents and the grand-
mother equally qualified. The child had never lived with the grand-
mother, while the foster parents had been the child's psychological 
parents for the first eighteen months of her life. In addition, the trial 
court found that the child had "bloomed enormously" due to the 
"love, affection and special efforts" of the foster parents. 105 As to the 
foster parents' capacity and willingness to foster a healthy racial iden-
tity in the child, the trial court found that the foster parents had 
bought preschool Black history and coloring books for their previ-
ously adopted child, a Black boy and had instituted an "affirmative 
program" of fostering a healthy racial identity with him. ~06 By focus-
ing on race, the trial court failed to give adequate consideration to 
these other findings. 
In custody disputes between parents of different races, courts have 
also placed excessive weight on race. Fountaine v. Fountaine, 107 for 
99. 565 P.2d at 339. 
100. 565 P.2d at 338. 
101. 565 P.2d at 339. 
102. 565 P.2d at 339 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). 
103. 454 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982). For a discussion of the appellate court's decision, see supra 
notes 42-46 and accompanying text. 
104. The trial court found that both the white foster parents and the Black grandmother had 
"shown love and concern for the child" and that both were "reasonably stable." 454 A.2d at 
781. 
105. 454 A.2d at 780 n.1. 
106. 454 A.2d at 780. 
107. 133 N.E.2d 532 (Ill. 1956). 
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example, involved a white mother and Black father. After the divorce, 
the father initially obtained custody. The mother again sought cus-
tody after remarrying. The father argued that, because he and the 
children shared Black characteristics, the children would adjust to life 
better if they remained with him. The judge denied the mother's peti-
tion, despite finding that "if a difference in color was not involved in 
the case he would not hesitate for 'a moment in awarding custody to 
the mother.' " 108 The appellate court reversed on the basis that the 
trial court had relied solely on race. 109 Elsewhere, however, appellate 
courts have failed to correct trial courts' undue reliance on race. 110 
Moreover, there may have been countless cases in which race over-
whelmingly determined the outcome, but the parties did not appeal. 
Consideration of race harmed, not served, the interests of many of 
these children. 
2. Encouragement of Harmful Custody Litigation 
Professor Twila L. Perry identifies another risk of considering race 
in placement proceedings: race may encourage divorcing parents to 
litigate over the custody and race of their biracial child. 111 Discretion-
ary standards, as opposed to fixed rules, create incentives for parents 
to litigate custody. 112 "To the extent that race may be considered in 
the court's discretion, it will encourage the parties to litigate the cus-
tody issue.'' 113 Custody litigation, in turn, often harms the child who 
is at the center of the dispute and may feel uncertainty and torn loyal-
ties.114 Litigation also increases tension between the parents, thus de-
creasing the likelihood of postdivorce parental cooperation. 115 
Postdivorce cooperation is important for children in order for them to 
108. 133 N.E.2d at 534. 
109. 133 N.E.2d at 534·35. 
110. See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton County Dept. of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 
1200 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); Potter v. Potter, 127 N.W.2d 320 (Mich. 
1964); Ward v. Ward, 216 P.2d 755 (Wash. 1950). In Potter, a white couple divorced and the 
mother remarried a Black man. In denying her custody, the trial court described her as a "young 
woman who has been in serious rebellion ... [whose recent history] does not give a picture of 
certainty and stability." 127 N.W.2d at 326. Instead, the court placed the child with the mater· 
nal grandparents and awarded the father legal custody. In affirming the trial court, the appellate 
court found no evidence that race had been considered. The dissent disagreed, observing that 
"[t]he fears which form the muted thread of this whole proceeding are patently groundless" and 
believed that the majority had ignored factors favoring the mother such as an attractive home, a 
full-time mother, and a stepfather who was a surgeon. 127 N.W.2d at 329. 
111. Perry, supra note 2, at 67·69. 
112. See id. at 67. 
113. See id. 
114. Perry observes, "[c]hildren have an interest in not being the subjects of long and bitter 
litigations to determine their custody. Many experts have expressed the view that litigated cus-
tody disputes can have a negative effect on children, often resulting in tension, uncertainty, and 
feelings of torn loyalties." Id. at 63 (footnote omitted). 
115. See Chambers, supra note 89, at 559 (noting that harmful costs of custody disputes 
include protracted litigation and embittered litigants). 
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experience a positive relationship with both parents. 116 
A custody dispute may be even more traumatic for a biracial child 
than for a child born to parents of the same race. The parent who 
benefits from considerations of race will likely attempt to focus the 
hearing on race. 117 This action may create tension around the very 
issue over which the child is expected to have difficulty, her racial 
identity. 118 
The threat to parental cooperation after divorce is also particularly 
worrisome for a biracial child. Positive relationships with both par-
ents are especially important for the child of an interracial marriage in 
order for her to have access to both her racial backgrounds.119 There-
fore, by encouraging litigation over custody and race, consideration of 
race by courts may harm the biracial child by limiting her access to 
the noncustodial parent in the postdivorce period and thus depriving 
her of half her racial heritage.120 
This Part has argued that black and biracial children are harmed 
in various ways when courts and agencies practice racial matching. 
When practiced by adoption agencies, racial matching results in harm-
ful delays for these children and jeopardizes their chances for perma-
nent placement. In the judicial process, consideration of race impairs 
the courts' ability to consider all relevant factors appropriately and 
encourages litigation. Given these concrete harms suffered by black 
and biracial children, courts and agencies should abandon racial-
matching policies unless the risks of transracial placement are clearly 
substantiated. The following Part argues that they are not. 121 
116. Some states explicitly include the ability of the custodial parent to promote a relation-
ship between the child and the noncustodial parent as a factor to consider when placing a child. 
Michigan's Child Custody Act of 1970, for example, was amended in 1980 to include in the list 
of factors relating to the "best-interests" standard, "[t]he willingness and ability of each of the 
parents to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the 
child and the other parent." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23(3)(j) (West 1993); see also 
Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child-Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757, 789-
92 (1985) (arguing that postdivorce hostility has deleterious effects on children). 
117. Perry, supra note 2, at 67. 
118. Litigating over race "can result in the unhappy scene of parents trading allegations 
about racism, impaired racial identity, and real; perceived or invented attitudes of relatives and 
grandparents about interracial relationships and interracial children." Id. 
119. See infra section III.C. 
120. In one study, a seven-year-old biracial child named Kevin was experiencing identity 
confusion. His father was Black; his mother, with whom he lived, was white. Kevin's identity 
confusion stemmed from his lack of access to his Black heritage. The mother, still angry toward 
Kevin's father, prevented Kevin frOJll communicating with his father's side of the family. Also, 
Kevin's father, due to his bitterness over the divorce, did not want to see Kevin. Ruth G. Mc-
Roy & Edith M. Freeman, Racial-Identity Issues Among Mixed-Race Children, 8 Soc. WORK 
Eouc. 164, 169-71 (1986). The study did not indicate whether race contributed to the bitterness 
of the divorce but, if race does increase parental hostility, problems like those suffered by Kevin 
would result from the inclusion of race in the divorce proceeding. 
121. The question whether to attempt to match children with parents of the same race "'is 
not simply whether racial matching is good or bad, but also whether racial matching is better 
than the alternatives." Schneider, supra note 16, at 1395. Even assuming racial matching has 
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III. QUESTIONING THE CASE AGAINST TRANSRACIAL 
PLACEMENT 
Many empirical studies indicate that transracially placed Black 
children are as well adjusted as their inracially placed counterparts. 122 
The success of transracial placement revealed by these studies and the 
demonstrable harms of racial matching123 seriously call into question 
the wisdom of resisting transracial placement. Although some studies 
report difficulties with transracial placement, 124 they are inconclu-
some justification, the costs of such policies, both in the child welfare system and the judiciary, 
suggest that courts and agencies should forgo racial considerations. 
122. A survey of the major studies on transracial adoption concludes that transrncinlly 
placed children seem in general to be as well adjusted as other adopted children. Bartholet, supra 
note 6, at 1208 n.120; see also Angela T. McCormick, Transracial Adoption: A Critical View of 
the Courts' Present Standards, 28 J. FAM. L. 303, 316 n.116 (1989-1990). 
Several studies indicate that parents of transracial adoptees typically foster a healthy sense of 
racial identity and pride in their children. See O'Brien, supra note 11, at 494. The major studies 
conducted on transracial adoptees - studies done by Black people and whites, by proponents 
and opponents to transracial adoption - reveal substantial evidence thnt transracial adoptees 
have a strong sense of racial identity while at the same time being fully integrated into their 
families and communities. Bartholet, supra note 6, at 1208-09. There is significant support for 
the conclusion that transracial adoptees are well adjusted in their schools and communities in 
terms of achievement, adjustment, and self-esteem. Id. at 1209. Moreover, where transracinl 
adoptees have experienced adjustment problems, studies have found that the child's age at place-
ment or prior foster care experience more likely caused problems rather than the transracial 
placement. For studies finding problems relating to placement age, see Richard P. Barth et al., 
Predicting Adoption Disruption, 33 Soc. WORK 227, 231-33 (1988) (documenting benefits of per-
manent adoption and finding age at placement related to adoption disruption, but finding race 
difference between parent and child not related to adoption disruption); Bowen, supra note 7, at 
502. For studies finding problems relating to foster care, see Howard, supra note 2, at 536 n.167. 
Silverman and Feigelman report that maladjustment in transracially adopted children is due 
primarily to their age at placement rather than racial differences. Bowen, supra note 7, at 502. 
Professor Bowen explains the Silverman-Feigelman report as relating to the adopted children's 
adjustment to adoptive parents. Bowen, supra note 7, at 502 n.69. 
In his doctoral research, Professor Silverman studied Black, Vietnamese, Colombian, and 
Korean children placed with white parents and compared them to inracially adopted white chil-
dren. The findings suggested that race played no significant factor in the children's adjustment, 
but that the longer a child remained in his or her preadoptive environment, the more the child 
experienced maladjustment after adoption. Arnold R. Silverman, Transracial Adoption in the 
United States: A Study of Assimilation and Adjustment (1980) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Wisconsin (Madison)), abstracted in 41 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTL. No. 5, at 
2311-A (1980). 
123. See supra Part II. 
124. Amuzie Chimezie, Transracial Adoption of Black Children, 20 Soc. WORK. 296, 299-
300 (1975) (claiming that transracial adoptees suffer peer and community rejection); Susan J. 
Grossman, A Child of a Different Color: Race as a Factor in Adoption and Custody Proceedings, 
17 BUFF. L. REV. 303, 329 (1968) (community rejection); see also Bowen, supra note 7, at 506 (A 
NABSW report "suggests that various Blacks who grew up in white adoptive or foster homes 
universally experienced identity problems. Various individuals in the group expressed fears of, or 
prejudice towards, other Blacks. Another individual 'stated that she thought of herself as cau-
casi[a]n ... even though she knows she is Black.' "). 
One study found that 23% of families with transracially adopted children were "in trouble." 
The study did not, however, investigate other factors that could cause adjustment problems, such 
as the amount of time the children had spent in institutionalized and foster care. Moreover, the 
researchers found that the 77% success rate was approximately the same as the success rate for 
white infant adoptions and older-child adoptions. Howard, supra note 2, at 536-37 & n.167. 
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sive. 125 Therefore, an evaluation of racial matching should examine 
the reasons for adopting such policies in the first place. Only if the 
perceived risks of transracial placement are substantiated, and such 
risks outweigh the demonstrable costs of racial-matching policies, 
should racial matching continue. 
This Part critically evaluates the case against transracial place-
ment. Section III.A questions the argument that racial matching is 
necessary to foster a positive racial identity in a Black child. Section 
III.B addresses and criticizes the argument that Black parents are bet-
ter suited than white parents to teach a Black child skills for coping 
with racism. Section III.C focuses on biracial children and challenges 
the assumption that such children should be treated as Black and 
placed with Black parents. Finally, Section III.D considers the inter-
ests of Black culture and whether transracial placement frustrates 
those interests. This Part concludes that transracial placement does 
not harm black or biracial children or Black culture. Instead, this 
Part suggests that, in many ways, transracial placement may benefit 
Black children and Black culture. 
A. Racial Identity 
The NABSW argues that racial matching is necessary to foster a 
positive racial identity in Black children and to give these children the 
skills to cope with a racist society. 126 Assuming a positive racial iden-
tity is in a Black child's best interests, this section refutes the argument 
that same-race placement is necessary to accomplish this goal. Section 
125. See Howard, supra note 2, at 534 n.155 ("It is, of course, impossible to define 'success' 
or to measure whether it is accomplished, or to define 'cultural identity' or to determine whether 
it is lost. Any researcher investigating transracial adoption must face this problem, and all of the 
available data can be attacked on this point.") (citations omitted); id. at 541 ("The transracial 
adoption studies have not followed the children through adolescence, so they cannot provide 
definitive answers."); O'Brien, supra note 11, at 492 ("[T]he deleterious effects of interracial 
adoption are not at all certain."); id. at 495 (finding insufficient data on effects of transracial 
adoption from which to draw firm conclusions). In Jn re R.MG., the trial court observed that 
"all the experts who appeared in this matter agreed that not enough work has been done on the 
subject [of transracial adoption]" and found "that little medical or scientific attention has been 
devoted to this problem." 454 A.2d 776, 782 (D.C. 1982). 
After an extensive investigation of available empirical studies, Professor Bartholet concludes: 
Few studies ask questions designed to assess the potentially positive aspects of transracial 
adoption. Almost none ask questions designed to assess the potentially negative aspects of 
current matching policies .... [T]here have been no systematic attempts to measure the 
degree to which racial matching policies result in delay in and denial of adoptive placement. 
There have been no systematic attempts to evaluate on a comparative basis the experience of 
children placed immediately with waiting white families to the experience of children held in 
foster or institutional care on a temporary or permanent basis for same-race placement. 
Bartholet, supra note 6, at 1208. But see id. at 1208 n.119; Barth et al., supra note 122, at 231 
(documenting benefits of permanent adoption and finding age at placement related to adoption 
disruption, but race difference between parent and child not related to adoption disruption). 
For a comprehensive review of empirical research on transracial placement, see Bartholet, 
supra note 6, at 1207-26. 
126. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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III.A.1 discusses whether a Black child must identify with Black cul-
ture in order to maintain a positive racial identity. Section III.A.2 
discusses whether a positive racial identity depends on the strength of 
racial identity - that is, the extent to which being Black dominates a 
child's identity. Both discussions consider the extent to which the race 
of the parents determines the racial identity of the child. This section 
concludes that transracial placement does not impair the healthy de-
velopment of a Black child's racial identity or overall self-esteem. 
1. Black Cultural Identity 
Opponents of transracial placement argue that a Black child needs 
Black parents in order to develop an appropriate racial identity. 127 
What is meant by the term racial identity, however, is ambiguous. It 
could mean simply that the child identifies as a Black person, or it 
could mean something more - namely, that the child identifies with 
Black culture. 128 It is the latter concept of Black identity as a cultural 
concept that the NABSW argues is in a Black child's best interests. 129 
Assuming the existence of a Black-American culture, 130 two further 
questions arise: first, whether a Black child's interests are best served 
by identification with Black culture; and, second, whether Black par-
ents are necessary to foster such an identity. 
As to the first question, identification with Black culture has plau-
sible benefits for Black children.131 First, by identifying with Black 
culture, a Black child may gain membership within the Black commu-
nity and thereby receive support from others who share her Blackness 
and value it. 132 Second, identifying with Black culture may benefit 
127. See, e.g., Bowen, supra note 7, at 506 n.91; Howard, supra note 2, at 538 ("Critics of 
transracial adoption .... argue that white parents, no matter how hard they try, simply cannot 
provide an environment in which the child can retain or develop his or her black or Indian 
identity."); supra text accompanying note 8. 
128. Kathi Taylor writes, 
Racial identity and ethnic identity are probably the two most commonly applied [terms] and 
are often used interchangeably. However, several scholars differentiate between them. For 
instance, Casas (1984) argues that race is biologically determined, whereas ethnicity is "a 
group classification of individuals who share a unique social and cultural heritage (customs, 
language, religion, and so on) passed on from generation to generation." 
Kathi E. Taylor, The Dilemma of Difference: The Relationship of the Intellectual Development, 
Racial Identity, and Self-Esteem of Black and White Students to Their Tolerance for Diversity 
67 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland) (citations omitted). Biii see 
id. at 68 ("E. Smith (1989) .... conceptualizes racial identity to be a component of ethnic 
identity."). 
129. The NABSW's position is based in part on the belief that, "in a racist society, Black 
children must not lose their cultural identity." Bowen, supra note 7, at 505. 
130. For a discussion on whether Black Americans in fact share a cohesive culture, see infra 
section 111.D.2. 
131. Besides the two benefits discussed here, Black culture may also provide a child with the 
skills to cope with racial prejudice. Bowen, supra note 7, at 505. The coping skills rationale is 
discussed infra section 111.B. 
132. "McRoy and Zurcher found that transracially adopted children develop a sense of be-
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Black children because the culture itself embodies positive statements 
about being Black, and these statements enable the child to value her 
race. Therefore, by identifying with Black culture, a Black child will 
feel better about being Black because of the positive feelings engen-
dered by the culture and the support received from other Black people 
who, as a result of the shared cultural affiliation, accept the Black 
child as a member of the group. 
Certainly it is in a Black child's interest to feel positive about her 
racial identity. What is less clear, however, is whether identification 
with Black culture is coextensive with a positive racial identity. Being 
Black, at minimum, is having a physical characteristic.133 There is no 
logical reason why a healthy attitude towards one's appearance re-
quires identification with an entire cultural system; a child could feel 
good about being Black without identifying with Black culture. In-
deed, this proposition is borne out by empirical data. Studies have 
found that transracially adopted Black children who identify less with 
Black culture nonetheless feel positive about being Black.134 
One risk for Black children who do not identify with Black culture 
is that they may feel less comfortable associating with other Black peo-
ple.135 If such children feel positive about their racial identity, how-
ever, why is association with other Black people necessary for the 
welfare of the individual Black child? In fact, greater association with 
white people may carry its own benefits. 136 Thus, a positive racial 
identity, which presumably is in a Black child's best interests, need not 
require identification with Black culture. 
The second question is whether white parents are capable of foster-
longing and acceptance by identifying with other blacks." McRoy & Freeman, supra note 120, at 
166-67. 
133. Katherine Gale, Color Me a Person, CHRISTIAN Set. MONITOR, Sept II, 1990, at 19 
(" 'Black' is a descriptive word that applies only to physical appearance."); Taylor, supra note 
128, at 67 ("Casas (1984) argues that race is biologically determined, whereas ethnicity is 'a 
group classification ... .' "). But see Taylor, supra note 128, at 68 ("E. Smith (1989) ... concep-
tualizes racial identity to be a component of ethnic identity."); Lena Williams, In a 90's Quest for 
Black Identity, Intense Doubts and Disagreement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1991, at Al ("'Aside 
from skin color, there is something to being ethnically black in terms of outlook on life, values 
and beliefs.'" (quoting Dr. Roderick J. Watts of DePaul University, Chicago, a consultant on 
human diversity and assistant professor of psychology)). 
A concept of race as a biological trait is not necessarily inconsistent with viewing race as a 
cultural or ethnic identity. Society may construct certain values, attitudes, and norms of behav-
ior around a biologically determined trait. Sex and skin color are two examples. The point of 
characterizing race as a physical trait is that a Black child's physical appearance is the only 
immutable aspect of her racial identity and, therefore, the only racial trait that her identity must 
include. 
134. Cf Bowen, supra note 7, at 500 (stating that transracially placed black children may 
have as strong a self-esteem as their inracially placed counterparts but that they are less likely to 
identify strongly as Black). 
135. See McRoy & Freeman, supra note 120, at 166 ("[A mixed-race transracial adoptee] 
may tend to prefer white friends and dates .... "). 
136. See infra section III.B. 
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ing a Black cultural identity in a Black child. Racial-matching propo-
nents argue that Black parents are better suited to foster an identity 
with Black culture. 137 Such an argument proceeds as follows: Black 
parents will transmit their own culture to their children. It may be 
difficult, if not impossible, for white parents to raise their children in a 
culture foreign to their own. 138 Therefore, a Black child should be 
placed with Black parents in order to foster an identity with Black 
culture. 
Many white parents who adopt Black children, however, success-
fully teach these children Black culture and foster a sense of ethnic 
pride. 139 At the same time, not all Black families identify with Black 
culture, nor would they provide such a cultural setting for their chil-
dren.140 White parents can provide books and music about Black cul-
ture, encourage friendships with other Black children, and encourage 
participation in Black cultural activities. 141 For those transracially 
placed Black children who do not identify with Black culture, the 
problem may be ignorance, rather than inability, on the parents' part 
regarding how to foster a Black cultural identity. Instead of refusing 
to place Black children with white parents, agencies could educate 
such parents about ways to teach the children Black culture. 
Concededly, teaching their children Black culture may not be an 
easy task for all white parents. Many white parents may be unable142 
or unwilling143 to meet the challenge. The neighborhood or commu-
137. See Howard, supra note 2, at 538 (noting the position of transracial adoption critics that 
white parents cannot adequately foster ethnic identity). 
138. Id. 
139. Bartholet, supra note 6, at 1209; O'Brien, supra note 11, at 494. But see Howard, supra 
note 2, at 554 ("Concededly, ethnic identity will be diminished, even when white parents are 
willing to accept help from the child welfare agency in building their black child's racial 
identity."). 
140. Mahoney, supra note 15, at 498 ("Some Blacks choose to live in primarily white neigh-
borhoods and send their children to schools where they may be the only Black children."). 
141. Seventy-five percent of the transracially adoptive parents studied by Simon and Altstein 
made efforts to foster their child's ethnic identity through books, music, toys, and the like, and by 
providing opportunities to play with other nonwhite children. Howard, supra note 2, at 539. 
Speaking of her adopted "coffee-with-cream"-colored infant named Rachel, Professor 
Mahoney looks ahead: "We need to have Black friends, send her to integrated schools and 
provide her with toys and books that relate to her culture, not only for her sake but for ours." 
Mahoney, supra note 15, at 500. 
142. Before allowing a transracial placement, McRoy recommends investigating the residen-
tial setting of the prospective parents to determine the availability of Black role models, peer 
groups, churches, and other cultural institutions. In addition, McRoy suggests providing post-
adoption consultation to transracial families to aid in developing an appropriate black identity. 
Bowen, supra note 7, at 501. 
143. Mahoney writes: 
In the 1960s, at least some of the families that adopted Black children believed that the 
way to conquer racism was to pretend that it did not exist. They treated their children as if 
they were white, sent them to white schools and made little, if any, effort to provide them 
with Black culture. 
Mahoney, supra note 15, at 499. 
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nity in which white parents live may lack opportunities for the child to 
celebrate Black culture or to interact with other Black people. 144 In 
addition, if the child does not experience the benefits of Black cultural 
identity until later in life, white parents may not realize the impor-
tance of Black culture for the child. Moreover, although many white 
parents may make commendable efforts to teach their children Black 
culture, their children may not identify with Black culture to the full 
extent that a child would if immersed in a Black family and Black 
community .145 
As a general rule, then, Black parents may be more capable of 
transferring Black culture to Black adopted children. As discussed 
above, however, failing to identify with Black culture is not necessarily 
inconsistent with developing a positive racial identity. White parents 
should be able to teach a Black child to value her identity, including 
her race. Therefore, in terms of fostering a positive racial identity, 
albeit not necessarily with Black culture, white parents may equally 
serve the interests of Black children. 
2. Strength of Racial Identity 
Another question regarding racial identity is the extent to which a 
positive racial identity requires a strong racial identity. A child with a 
strong racial identity is one who places a high priority on her race as a 
component of her self-image. Put simply, a Black child with a strong 
racial identity views her race as a more important aspect of her iden-
tity than most of her other personal attributes or characteristics. This 
issue is important because studies show that many transracially 
adopted Black children place less significance on their race than in-
racially adopted Black children. 146 In a society that emphasizes race 
and often denigrates the Black race, a strong racial identity arguably 
enables a Black child's self-esteem to weather the messages of inferi-
ority she receives from others. As with a Black cultural identity, a 
strong racial identity may be more likely to result from having Black 
parents rather than white. 
The important question, however, is the extent to which the 
strength of a Black child's racial identity is in her best interests. In 
fact, the same studies that reveal a less race-conscious racial identity in 
transracial adoptees also show a comparable level of overall positive 
144. But see id. at 498 ("Some white families choose to Jive and work in integrated neighbor-
hoods and social groups."). 
145. Howard, supra note 2, at 554 (conceding that transracially placed Black children will 
have diminished ethnic identity despite white parents' efforts to foster racial identity). 
146. See Bowen, supra note 7, at 500; McRoy & Freeman, supra note 120, at 166 ("Other 
transracial adoptive parents tend to take a color-blind attitude to racial differences between the 
child and family and therefore deemphasize racial identity to the child. The child in these cir-
cumstances usually acquires similar perceptions."). But see Bowen, supra note 7, at 499. 
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adjustment and self-esteem.147 A child whose self-image is less domi-
nated by her race may be just as happy as a child whose race is central 
to her being. A child's identity is multifaceted, with many attitudes, 
beliefs, and characteristics composing her self-image; it is unclear why 
the quality of a child's identity should depend on the emphasis placed 
on any particular trait. 
To illustrate the point, compare two hypothetical people. When 
asked who they are, the first replies: "I am a husband and a father, a 
writer, a teacher, and a musician. I am also Black, a man, and a 
Methodist." The second person replies: "I am Black, and I am a doc-
tor; I am a mother, a wife, and a Presbyterian. I also write poetry and 
sing in a choir." Does the second person necessarily have a healthier 
identity because race is a priority? Can one even conclude that the 
second person's racial identity is more positive? In fact, the first per-
son may feel equally or more positive about being Black although he 
gives it less significance. 
Racial-matching proponents could argue that, in an ideal world, 
race need not have great significance but, in reality, contemporary 
American society not only places great significance on race, but is es-
pecially hostile toward the Black race. Under these circumstances, a 
Black child needs not only a positive racial identity, but one that is 
substantial enough to withstand the racism that characterizes much of 
mainstream ideology. 
One method to cope with a personal characteristic disfavored by 
society, however, is to recognize its insignificance. When a child 
whose Black skin is one of her most valued attributes experiences ra-
cist treatment, she must struggle against the racism to preserve her 
self-esteem. If the racist message has any effect, the very center of her 
identity is maligned. When, on the other hand, a child's race is merely 
one of many characteristics and one of minor importance, she is less 
vulnerable to racial attacks. If the message of racial inferiority affects 
this child, it will certainly damage her self-esteem, but perhaps to a 
lesser extent because her race accounts for a smaller proportion of her 
self-image. Due to the minor role race plays in this child's identity, 
she has less to protect, less that can be damaged, and less to repair. 
Thus, although transracially placed Black children may in general 
identify less strongly as Black, or with Black culture, than inracially 
placed Black children, they may feel comparably positive about their 
race and overall self-esteem. In short, it is unclear whether transracial 
placement helps or harms the children's self-esteem and positive racial 
identity, and therefore courts and agencies should not consider these 
factors to counsel against transracial adoption. 
147. See Bowen, supra note 7, at 500 (stating that transracially placed Black children may 
have as strong a self-esteem as their inracially placed counterparts but they are less likely to 
identify strongly as Black). 
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B. Coping Skills 
Opponents of transracial placement also argue that only Black par-
ents can teach a Black child the "coping skills" necessary to survive in 
a racist society. I48 Although often advanced as separate issues, coping 
skills and racial identity are closely related. How well a Black child 
copes with society depends in large part on her feelings about her race. 
Thus, any discussion of coping skills necessarily involves questions of 
racial identity. Unlike the previous section, however, this section dis-
cusses how a child's racial identity bears on the child's ability to cope 
with the world outside. The question that courts and agencies should 
consider is whether Black parents are better able to teach a Black child 
how to cope with society. This Note divides coping skills into two 
related components: those that enable a child to achieve interpersonal 
and scholastic success and those that enable her to protect her self-
esteem from potentially harmful interactions with others. 
A child's achievement interests include interpersonal success and 
scholastic performance. In terms of interpersonal success, transracial 
placement may be harmful to the extent that transracial adoptees are 
less comfortable associating with other Black children than are in-
racial adoptees. On the other hand, transracial adoptees tend to asso-
ciate more comfortably with white children. I49 Courts and agencies 
should not assume these interracial friendships are less fulfilling than 
same-race friendships. As such, transracially placed children fare as 
well as same-race placements with respect to the quality and amount 
of interpersonal relations in their lives. In fact, because white children 
are generally more numerous, they may fare better. 
More remarkable are the scholastic benefits of transracial place-
ment. Iso Rightly or wrongly, achievement in American society gener-
ally inures to those whose values and motivations track those of the 
dominant culture. Black people who identify, or at least comply, with 
the dominant or "white" culture generally achieve greater academic, 
career, and monetary success.Isl Similarly, Black children who iden-
tify with dominant cultural values achieve better grades and score bet-
ter on scholastic measurement tests. Is2 In contrast, many Black adults 
148. See id. at 509-11; see also In re R.MG., 454 A.2d 776, 802-03 (D.C. 1982) (Newman, 
C.J., dissenting) (discussing black children's need for "survival skills"); Bartholet, supra note 6, 
at 1222 (noting that "[c]ritics of transracial adoption have claimed that only blacks can teach 
black children the coping skills needed for life in a racist society"). 
149. See generally McRoy & Freeman, supra note 120, at 165-66 (discussing racial self-con-
cepts of transracially adopted children). 
150. See, e.g., Bartholet, supra note 6, at 1222 n.159. 
151. "[R]esistance ... to identifying too strongly with the Black community [characterizes] 
... Black adults in the workforce who have achieved some measure of success above the existing 
job ceiling." Signithia Fordham, Racelessness as a Factor in Black Students' School Success: 
Pragmatic Strategy or Pyrrhic Victory?, 58 HARV. Eouc. REV. 54, 80 (1988). 
152. Id. (discussing empirical study that found that high-achieving black high school stu-
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and Black children perceive academic and career ambitions as inimical 
to Black culture and, consequently, reject such ambitions in the name 
of ethnic loyalty. 153 Transracial adoptees are more likely to embrace 
the achievement goals of the dominant culture and, in turn, achieve 
greater success in school than inracially placed Black children. There-
fore, in terms of coping with the demands of academic achievement, 
transracial placement is not only as good as, but arguably better than, 
same-race placement. 
Opponents of transracial placement might respond that, for trans-
racial adoptees, these children obtain white friends and academic 
achievement at the expense of their racial identity and self-esteem. A 
Black child who denies or hides her ethnic identity in order to feign or 
mimic the ways of white people rejects a part of herself, thus causing 
inner conflict, confusion, and self-hatred. Especially in a society de-
fined by a pathology of racial discrimination, a Black child needs to 
connect with the Black community and celebrate her ethnic heritage. 
A child can learn these necessary coping skills from Black people who 
have experienced racism personally and struggled against demoraliza-
tion. Only Black parents, the argument goes, can give Black children 
these skills, and, therefore, Black parents are in Black children's best 
interests. 
The argument that adopting the dominant culture subjects a Black 
child to a feeling of racial self-rejection is supported by empirical re-
search indicating that some high-achieving Black children who act in 
accordance with the dominant culture feel ambivalence toward Black 
culture. 154 A critical difference, however, between these children and 
transracial adoptees is that, for these children, the dominant culture is 
different from, and often contrary to, the culture of their home and 
neighborhood. For transracial adoptees, the culture of their home is 
identical or consistent with the dominant culture; "acting white" 
comes naturally and, consequently, so does interpersonal or academic 
success. Their interpersonal styles and behavioral patterns need not 
conflict with those of white and other mainstream children; the aca-
demic ideals of their families need not conflict with those of the educa-
tional system. Thus, identifying with the dominant culture can itself 
be a valuable coping skill that transracial adoptees can exercise with-
out leaving their own culture at home. 
If a transracial adoptee can identify with the culture of her white 
parents, one must question whether such an identity enables her to 
dents associate themselves with the dominant culture); Overmier, supra note 58, at 165 (finding 
that biracial adolescents who identify with white middle·class values do better in school). 
153. "Black youths, for example, are sometimes accused by their peers of 'acting white' sim· 
ply because they study hard, go to the library or use standard English." Williams, supra note 
133, at 26. 
154. E.g., Fordham, supra note 151 (discussing empirical study which found that high· 
achieving Black high school students generally dissociate themselves from Black culture). 
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cope with racist attacks. White parents have not experienced the type 
of racial oppression suffered by Black Americans and, accordingly, 
have not needed to develop strategies for coping with such oppres-
sion.155 Black Americans, on the other hand, have experienced racial 
discrimination; their culture, which is informed by this experience, 
teaches its members how to cope with it.156 Black children can learn 
these coping skills from the culture and personal experience of Black 
parents but, according to this argument, black children raised by white 
parents will not learn the skills necessary to cope in a racist society. 157 
This argument, while appealing, rests on a questionable premise. The 
argument assumes that a person must experience racism first hand, or 
at least must identify with the culture of people who have experienced 
it directly, in order to teach a child how to cope with it.158 This lack 
of experience with racial oppression, however, need not prevent white 
parents from teaching coping skills to their Black children. 
For several reasons, white parents can furnish a Black child with 
skills to cope with racism. First, the experience of white parents may 
benefit Black children by teaching these children to be less race con-
scious.159 In American society, being white does not distinguish one 
from the majority of successful people and, consequently, a white per-
son has less reason to focus on her race. Not surprisingly then, white 
parents tend to place less importance on the race of their Black 
adoptees than do Black adoptive parents. 160 In contrast, Black par-
ents have learned the importance of their race in this society and can, 
in turn, teach their children to emphasize their race. But white par-
155. Having never been black, the white adoptive parents might not have been subjected to 
the kinds of discriminatory treatment that have been the lot of black people. Therefore, they 
might not have needed to maintain in their cognitive and psychic makeup the expectation of 
probable oppressive treatment by whites .... 
. . . When white adoptive parents are unable to transmit to the black adoptive child the 
tendency toward doubt and the temporary suspension of trust, especially when dealing with 
white persons, they are failing to satisfy the "psychosurvival" need of the black child. 
Blacks need to have an inclination toward doubt of white persons as a basic attribute in 
the fight against racism .... This doubt - call it "black paranoia" or what you will - is an 
important and necessary aspect of black culture. 
Chimezie, supra note 124, at 298-99, cited in Howard, supra note 2, at 540; see also Bowen, supra 
note 7, at 510. 
156. See Bowen, supra note 7, at 509-11. 
157. POSITION PAPER I, supra note 8. 
158. See Bowen, supra note 7, at 510 ("To suggest that the skills of survival, coping and 
defense can be taught by those who have never themselves learned them is at best mystifying."). 
159. Section 111.A.2, supra, discussed race consciousness in relation to racial hostility from 
others, concluding that, in some ways, placing little emphasis on race enables a black child to 
cope with racism. This coping skill - a lower level of race consciousness - is a coping skill 
transracial placement can provide. 
160. "Other transracial adoptive parents tend to take a color-blind attitude to racial differ-
ences between the child and family and therefore deemphasize racial identity to the child. The 
child in these circumstances usually acquires similar perceptions." McRoy & Freeman, supra 
note 120, at 166. 
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ents, by deemphasizing race, may enable a Black child to cope better 
with racial attacks because the child may view the attacks less 
personally. 161 · 
Second, although white parents are unlikely to have experienced 
racial discrimination, they could teach their Black child to view a ra-
cial insult as one might view other insults. White people, as individu-
als, have not been spared maltreatment from others, and white parents 
routinely teach their children how to cope with insults from others. 
Black children can learn and use these skills to cope with a variety of 
offensive insults, including racist ones. For example, a person called 
"commie" for protesting Vietnam or a woman referred to as "girl" by 
her boss has some experience from which to empathize with her Black 
child who is called "nigger" at school. A person who stutters, limps, 
or cannot hear well also gains analogous experience that could benefit 
a Black child. Must a parent have worn glasses, been fat, worn braces, 
or been short in order to help her child who, while on the playground, 
is called "four eyes," "fatso," "tinsel teeth," or "shrimp"? Consider 
especially the coping skills that white parents employ when stigma-
tized for adopting Black children. 162 Thus, the dominant culture and 
the personal experience of white parents provide them with a rich 
source of coping skills that they can teach to their Black children. 
Finally, having white parents may enable a Black child to cope 
better with racism because, as a member of the dominant race, a white 
parent's repudiation of Black inferiority may seem more credible than 
the same message from a Black parent. Assume a Black child en-
counters a white person who tells her that she is inferior because of her 
race. To cope with the remark, the child needs to dismiss or disbelieve 
it in order to protect her self-esteem. The child should believe that her 
Blackness is not a mark of shame but rather a mark of beauty, or at 
least an incidental physical attribute. She can learn this belief or "cop-
ing skill" from her parents. A message of racial equality from a white 
parent carries a certain credibility over the same message from a Black 
parent because the Black parent has a greater personal interest in re-
futing white superiority than does the white parent. True, white par-
ents have an interest in racial equality in order to protect their Black 
child. From the child's perspective, however, a Black parent might 
espouse racial equality for the parent's sake as well as for the child's 
sake; a white parent, by contrast, diminishes her own status relative to 
the Black race by advancing the equality of the races. Thus, a white 
parent's denial of Black inferiority may be more believable because it 
is less self-serving. At the least, a white parent's motive in denying 
racial inferiority will appear to be solely to support and show love for 
161. See, e.g., id. at 166. 
162. White families who adopt Black children are sometimes subjected to intense bigotry. 
Bowen, supra note 7, at 504. 
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the child. Such a gesture might itself benefit the child. In this way, 
the race of white parents need not hinder their ability to help their 
Black child cope with racism and, arguably, may give them an 
advantage. 
Although questions of racial and personality development do not 
lend themselves well to firm conclusions, the discussion of the preced-
ing two sections has, consistent with available empirical data, raised 
serious questions concerning the wisdom of racial-matching policies. 
Both in terms of racial identity and coping skills, the ability of white 
parents to protect their Black child's interests is not clearly inferior to 
that of Black parents. 
The arguments in this and the previous section should not imply 
that placement with white parents is necessarily better than placement 
with Black parents; both offer benefits.163 These arguments are in-
tended to demonstrate the lack of justification for racial matching, not 
the superiority of transracial placement. In addition, a white prefer-
ence would cause similar psychological costs that children currently 
suffer from racial matching in the adoption process164 and in custody 
proceedings.165 If courts and placement agencies are to fulfill their 
duty to serve the best interests of Black children, they should consider 
the benefits of transracial placement. If such benefits are at least com-
parable to those of Black-parent placement, this fact undermines the 
basis for favoring Black placement. Nor is a shift to a transracial pref-
erence policy warranted. By ignoring race when placing a Black child, 
courts and agencies would avoid the concrete harms of current policies 
without subjecting the child to substantiated risks. Thus, when plac-
ing a Black child, courts and agencies should not favor Black place-
ment over white. 
C. The Interests of Biracial Children 
The NABSW argues that biracial children should be treated as 
completely black and, accordingly, should not be placed with white 
parents. 166 Consistent with this view, courts and adoption agencies 
usually categorize biracial children as black when considering place-
ment.167 The primary justification for this treatment is that, in the 
eyes of American society, a biracial child is black168 and, therefore, 
163. See infra notes 188, 191. 
164. See supra sections II.A and II.B.1. 
165. See supra section II.B.2. 
166. Bowen, supra note 7, at 505 n.88. See also supra note 9 for an explanation of this Note's 
use of the terms Black and black. 
167. See supra section I.C. 
168. "Society has historically tended to categorize any person who has any amount of Negro 
blood as a member of the black, or Negro, race. Therefore, when whites married blacks, their 
children, regardless of skin color, became black - not black-white." McRoy & Freeman, supra 
note 120, at 165; see also JAMES F. DAVIS, WHO Is BLACK?: ONE NATION'S DEFINITION (1991) 
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must identify positively with being black and must be able to cope 
with discrimination toward her as a black person. 169 This section 
challenges the presumption that biracial children should be treated as 
black and placed with black parents.17° 
If society treats biracial children as black, any risks to biracial chil-
dren from being placed with white parents are at least as questionable 
as the risks for black children. To the extent that biracial and black 
children differ, avoiding "trans" -racial 171 placement of biracial chil-
dren is even less justifiable. A biracial child is as white as she is black 
and thus "bears a legitimate claim to membership in both groups."172 
The racial duality of such a child suggests that her interests may be 
best served, or at least comparably served, by a positive identification 
with both of her cultural heritages, both to the same extent. 173 Indeed, 
many biracial persons identify themselves as neither black or white, 
but rather as "mixed."174 
By treating a biracial child as black, the courts decide first, that the 
biracial child should identify herself as one and only one race, and 
(American society generally defines Black according to a one-drop rule - that a person is Black 
ifhe has any traceable Black-African ancestry); Mahoney, supra note 15, at 487 n. l; Perry, supra 
note 2, at 65; Itabari Njeri, Cal/for Census Category Creates Interracial Debate, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 
13, 1991, at El ("[S]ocially, [in America,] any known African ancestry makes you black."), 
Statutory definitions provided that a person is a member of a minority group either if he has a 
certain percentage of minority blood or any trace whatsoever. McRoy & Freeman, supra note 
120, at 165. 
169. See, e.g., In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614 (Pa. 1983). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in 
affirming the trial court's placement of a biracial child with black foster parents instead of white 
grandparents, cited the testimony of the black foster care mother that the biracial child would be 
treated as black and is therefore black. As a black, her testimony continued, the child needs a 
black parent to develop a healthy Black identity. 465 A.2d at 626-27. 
ltabari Njeri expresses a contrary view rejecting the societal definition that any Black ances-
try makes one Black: 
[I]t is not what one is considered to be or [how one is] treated that determines who we are, 
because people of color are always considered to be ignorant and lazy and lesser than Euro-
pean Americans. If we [mixed-race Americans] are to accept their considerations and per-
spectives of our identity, then we have beaten ourselves before we've started the race. 
Njeri, supra note 168, at E9-E10. 
170. See Bowen, supra note 7, at 505 n.88 ("The NABSW position allows that Black children 
includes children of Black-white parentage."); supra section I.B. 
171. Indeed, as this section suggests, the placement of biracial children with white parents is 
as much a same race placement as it is transracial. See also Bartholet, supra note 6, at 1173 n.8 
("These biracial children can be seen as at least a partial racial match with their white adoptive 
parents."). 
172. Philip M. Brown, Biracial Identity and Social Marginality, 7 CHILD AND ADOLESCENT 
Soc. WORK 319, 325 (1990); see also Overmier, supra note 58, at 158 ("[C]hildren of black/white 
unions ... are a unique group of mixed-race young people who defy simple racial classification 
and who have legitimate claims to both majority and minority status."). 
173. "The major task for biracial adolescents becomes integrating dual racial identifications 
into a single identity that affirms the positive aspects of each heritage .... " Overmier, supra note 
58, at 170. 
174. See McRoy & Freeman, supra note 120, at 165; see also Njeri, supra note 168, at El 
("[A] new generation of ethnically and racially mixed Americans is demanding the creation of a 
multiracial category for the U.S. Census."). 
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second, that this race should be black. For a biracial child, who needs 
exposure to both racial backgrounds175 and who needs to accept both 
cultural heritages, 176 choosing an all-black identity may contribute to 
a certain degree of identity confusion177 and self-rejection. 178 
Although American society has historically defined biracial people 
as black, 179 it is questionable whether black people, as a rule, view 
biracial people in this way. In fact, biracial children can experience 
rejection and alienation from black people as well as from white peo-
ple.180 At school, black and white students may jeer biracial children 
for "trying to 'be something they're not' or for thinking of themselves 
as being 'better than other blacks' because of having a white par-
ent." 181 At home, black and white family members may reject biracial 
children because they view them as the product of accident or poor 
judgment.182 In placing a biracial child, courts and adoption agencies 
ought to recognize that either alternative - placing her with black 
parents or white parents - may cause difficulties for the child, both by 
denying her access to one culture and by subjecting her to alienation 
from the culture within which she is placed. In either event, placing a 
biracial child in a black home will not necessarily prevent her from 
experiencing "social marginality."183 
175. Mixed-race children, in order to identify positively with their mixed background, need 
both black and white role models and peers. See McRoy & Freeman, supra note 120, at 166. 
176. See Overmier, supra note 58, at 170 (arguing that, to avoid developing negative identi-
ties, biracial adolescents need to "integrat[e] dual racial identifications into a single identity that 
affirms the positive aspects of each heritage"). 
177. A biracial child experiences unique stresses in developing her self-identity be.cause she 
confronts social pressures that attempt to force her into one racial category that is contrary to 
her own self-perception as a member of both groups. Brown, supra note 172, at 324-25. Courts 
ought not contribute to these children's anxiety and confusion. 
178. One biracial college student, Nia Mason, gives a personal account of how societal pres-
sures to be Black led her to reject her white heritage only to realize later that accepting her white 
background was necessary for accepting herself: 
I decided, if I'm [B]lack, then [see you] later for these white folks .... I rejected "white" 
adamantly . . . . Later I realized that that wasn't quite on target either. It certainly didn't 
make me feel better .... 
. . . Because you can't really reject who you are, you have to come to terms with who you are 
in terms of your race .... 
Patricia Kessel, Growing Up Integrated (Are You Black?), CRISIS, Mar. 1988, at 15, 18. 
In his doctoral research, Professor Marvin Arnold studied 28 biracial children. The findings 
indicated that most biracial children, when given a choice, identified themselves as mixed as 
opposed to black or white. Those who identified themselves as mixed demonstrated a greater 
degree of emotional and psychiatric stability, and a higher overall self-concept, than those who 
identified as black or white. Marvin C. Arnold, The Effects of Racial Identity on Self-Concept in 
Interracial Children (1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Saint Louis University), abstracted 
in 45 DISSERTATIONS ABSrRACTS INTL. No. 9, at 3000-A (1984). 
179. See supra note 169. 
180. Brown, supra note 172, at 333. 
181. McRoy & Freeman, supra note 120, at 166 (footnote omitted). 
182. Overmier, supra note 58, at 162. 
183. A socially marginal person, such as a member of a minority group, does "not fit neatly 
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In addition, a biracial child may gain certain benefits from white 
parents. A biracial child has an interest in identifying positively with 
her mixed heritage. While black parents who adopt biracial children 
usually perceive the children as black, white adoptive parents tend to 
view their biracial children as mixed. 184 Thus, a biracial child with 
white parents may be more likely to identify as mixed than one placed 
with black parents.185 By accepting her multiracial heritage, a biracial 
child may have a better chance to accept herself as a whole. 186 
Furthermore, by learning the dominant culture, a biracial child 
placed in a white home may experience less racist hostility in life than 
a biracial child raised in a black home. Opponents of transracial adop-
tion argue that black children need to cope with a racist society. 187 
The racist attitudes of people toward the child may harm the child and 
thus are relevant to the question of the child's interests. Presumably, 
if the attitudes of others were less hostile, there would be less danger to 
the biracial child's psyche. Persons harboring prejudices toward Black 
people and Black culture likely would feel less hostile toward a biracial 
person who exhibited traits and values associated with the dominant 
culture. White parents can acculturate a biracial child to the domi-
nant culture. Thus, such a child will probably encounter less racism 
and less prejudice-based obstacles to opportunities and advance-
ment.188 In this way, a biracial child may have less need for coping 
skills if placed with white parents. 
Studies of biracial adolescents indicate that those who identify 
more completely with the dominant culture tend to be more achieve-
ment oriented anq. attain greater academic success. 189 On the other 
into mainstream White society." Brown, supra note 172, at 319. A biracial person experiences 
even greater marginality since he is not easily racially categorized by those with whom he inter-
acts. Id. at 324. 
184. Bowen, supra note 7, at 499. 
185. Id. at 500. 
186. Besides fostering an identity as a black person, a black parent, due to resentment over 
discrimination, might explicitly or subtly teach a biracial child similarly to resent white people 
and the white within him. As Professor Schneider asks, "[w]ill the bitterness that blacks may 
feel about the black experience in America be difficult for a child of an interracial marriage who 
is in the custody of a black parent to cope with?" Schneider, supra note 16, at 139. But see Njeri, 
supra note 168, at EIO ("[M]ultiracial identity .... [represents] a repudiation of blackness born 
of [an] unwillingness to identify with a despised minority."). 
187. See Bowen, supra note 7, at 505. 
188. This argument is not intended to favor white culture over Black culture; rather, it is 
intended to show that, if the state considers societal prejudice when deciding whether to allow 
particular parent-child relationships, then the benefits to the child that stem from such relation-
ships have as much relevance as the costs. 
189. Overmier writes: 
The majority of biracial adolescents are well aware of racial prejudice and barriers to mobil-
ity. Therefore, they shape their current academic behavior and future aspirations accord· 
ingly. Those biracial teens who overidentify with their version of the black ghetto culture 
adopt a casual attitude toward their studies, express anti-achievement values, and fear rejec-
tion by their black peers if they are perceived as 'bookworms.' For those teens who identify 
with the white middle-class culture, educational achievement may be consistent with their 
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hand, feigning white culture when one identifies with Black culture is 
unhealthy and represents the "pathos of stigma."190 If a child inter-
nally identifies with white culture, however, behaving in accordance 
with it does not represent pretense. For a biracial child especially, 
identifying with white culture need not be pathological. Thus, learn-
ing and exhibiting dominant culture traits, which may result more 
often when children are raised by white parents, represents a type of 
coping skill by which biracial children can achieve success without 
self-rejection.19 1 
In sum, biracial children have a legitimate genetic and psychologi-
cal claim to both their black and white heritage. The need for biracial 
children to identify positively with Black culture suggests the desira-
bility of placing them with black parents. The equally legitimate need 
to identify positively with white culture, however, speaks in favor of 
placing biracial children with white parents. Two further considera-
tions undermine the policy of favoring Black placement for biracial 
children. First, although biracial children are generally viewed as 
black by society at large, they are not always accepted as black by 
black people. Second, placing biracial children with white parents 
may afford certain benefits over placing them with Black parents. 
They are more likely to identify with their mixed heritage rather than 
as black alone. In at least this way, the biracial child may accept her-
self more completely. Furthermore, with respect to coping skills in a 
racist society, biracial children may acquire beneficial skills from white 
parents. Thus, for biracial children, placement with white parents is, 
on balance, as much in their interests as placement with black parents. 
D. The Interests of Black People as a Group 
The NABSW has described transracial placement as a form of 
"cultural genocide."192 Black people as a cultural group, it argues, 
have an interest in making decisions concerning Black people and in 
preserving Black people as a distinct cultural group.193 Transracially 
placed Black children, the NABSW fears, will not identify as Black in 
peers. However, they may drive themselves to academic excellence to "prove" they are "as 
smart as" their white peers. 
Overmier, supra note 58, at 165 (citation omitted). 
190. Brown, supra note 172, at 332. 
191. To observe that the dominant culture embodies values better suited than those of Black 
culture for accomplishment in this society is not to accept this disparity as appropriate or inevita-
ble. In light of the educational and economic opportunities denied to Black people by the domi-
nant class, it is understandable for Black culture to reject dominant cultural values. In the 
meantime, however, if courts are to recognize racial prejudice by preferring same-race placement, 
they should also recognize the "coping skills" that a child can gain from the dominant culture. 
192. See supra note 15. 
193. See Bowen, supra note 7, at 501; Howard, supra note 2, at 530. 
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the sense of identifying with Black culture.194 Rather, these children 
will assimilate into the dominant culture and, by so doing, contribute 
to the dilution and decline of Black cultural existence. 195 In order to 
preserve Black culture, Black children should be placed only into 
Black homes where they can join and strengthen the Black commu-
nity. This cultural genocide argument is the focus of this section. 
1. The Necessity and Legitimacy of Preserving Black Culture 
Through Child Placement 
If Black people have an interest in preserving Black culture, two 
questions arise. First, does transracial placement jeopardize Black 
culture? Second, should courts and agencies use child placement to 
preserve Black culture? Unless both questions have affirmative an-
swers, courts and agencies should not consider Black cultural interests 
when placing a child. 
Although cultural interests need not affect, 196 or may even conflict 
with, 197 the interests of individual children, cultural interests have in-
fluenced the child-placement process. By enacting the Indian Child 
Welfare Act of 1978,198 for example, Congress recognized a substan-
tial interest in preserving Native-American culture and accorded sig-
nificant rights to Native-American communities to determine the 
placement of Native-American children. Similarly, commentators 
have argued, giving weight to Black cultural interests is justified in the 
child-placement context as a means to preserve Black culture. 199 
Professor Margaret Howard argues, however, that Native-Ameri-
can culture is at a significantly greater risk of extinction than Black 
culture.200 The rate at which agencies have placed Native-American 
children in mainstream society is so great that it has truly threatened 
194. Bowen, supra note 7, at 506. By Black children, it should be noted, the NABSW in· 
tends to include biracial children. Bowen, supra note 7, at 505 n.88. 
195. See Howard, supra note 2, at 531 ("Because transracial adoption removes children from 
their racial and ethnic groups, it poses some threat to the groups' interests in continuity."), 
196. Howard separates the interests of Black people as a cultural group and the best interests 
of an individual Black child. Id. at 530; see also supra section III.A. I. · 
197. Howard, supra note 2, at 503. 
198. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1988)). 
199. Professor Bowen argues that the history of the Black experience is analogous to that of 
Native Americans. Both have experienced tremendous discrimination, segregation, and oppres-
sion; both have suffered from inferior educational systems and residential areas; and both have 
been viewed as discrete and insular groups. Bowen, supra note 7, at 522 n.185; cf Mahoney, 
supra note 15, at 500 ("The NABSW is correct in their assumption that if white parents who 
adopt Black children treat them as if they are exactly the same as white children except for their 
color, something will be lost."). 
200. Howard, supra note 2, at 530-33. Perhaps the difference between the threat to Native-
American culture and the threat to Black culture is reflected by the fact that, while Black Ameri-
cans disagree on the desirability of transracial placement, Native Americans stand largely unified 
against it. See Howard, supra note 2, at 531 (citations omitted). But see supra note 199 (compar-
ing the Native-American experience to the Black experience). 
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the continued existence of Native Americans as a distinct ethnic 
group. 201 In contrast, the number of transracial placements of Black 
children is insignificant. 202 Thus, transracial placement does not simi-
larly jeopardize the interests of Black people in their continued exist-
ence as a cultural group.203 This argument does not mean that Black 
culture is free from risk, nor that Black culture is unworthy of preser-
vation. The point is simply that the enemy of Black culture is not 
transracial placement. 204 
Even if transracial placement did threaten Black culture, the best-
interests standard does not permit courts and agencies to advance cul-
tural interests at the expense of an individual child's interests. The 
cultural genocide argument is premised on an understanding that cul-
tural interests are inconsistent with, or at least go beyond, an individ-
ual Black child's interests.205 If cultural interests were no different 
than those of the individual child, courts and agencies would already 
protect Black culture under the best-interests standard without having 
to address group interests in a child-placement determination. Con-
sidering cultural interests undermines the child's interests. In some 
cases, a court could forgo a transracial placement that is in a child's 
best interests because of its concern for cultural interests. To compro-
mise a child's welfare in the name of culture, especially when the cul-
tural benefit is slight or nonexistent, is inimical to the purpose of child 
placement and violates the best-interests standard mandated by law.206 
Furthermore, even if the law allowed courts and agencies to bal-
201. By the mid 1970s, the rate of transracial placement of Native-American children had 
become" 'alarming,' 'shocking,' and a 'crisis ... of massive proportions.'" Id. at 520 (footnotes 
omitted). 
202. Id. at 532 ("[T]he charge [of cultural genocide] in [the adoption] context is simply spe-
cious - so few black children have been placed in white homes 'that no genuine threat exists to 
the continuance of blacks as a cultural, racial, or ethnic group."); Mahoney, supra note 15, at 501 
("Unless ..• the numbers of children adopted transracially were to increase enormously beyond 
what they currently are, the culture of African-Americans will not be destroyed.''). 
203. Howard, supra note 2, at 532-33. 
204. One writer identifies other reasons for the erosion of Black culture. These include the 
lack of Black history in the school curricula, the fallacious images of Black people conveyed by 
textbooks, and the separation of Black history from American history. Samuel L. Banks, Blacks 
in a Multiethnic Social Studies Curriculum: A Critical Assessment, 44 J. NEGRO Eouc. 82 
(1975). 
205. The President of NABSW writes: 
The lateral transfer of our children to white families is not in our best interest. Having 
white families raise our children to be white is at least a hostile gesture toward us as a people 
and at best the ultimate gesture of disrespect for our heritage as African people .... 
It is their aim to raise Black children with white minds .... 
. . . . We are on the right side of the transracial adoption issue. Our children are our 
future. 
See Morris F.X. Jeff, Jr., President's Message, NATL. ASSN. BLACK Soc. WORKERS NEWSL., 
Spring 1988, at 1-2 (emphasis added). 
206. See Bartholet, supra note 6, at 1237 ("[A]doption is not supposed to be about parent or 
community rights and interests, but rather about serving the best interests of children."). 
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ance cultural interests against the child's interests in placement pro-
ceedings, the child's interests would substantially outweigh cultural 
interests. A child whose placement is delayed suffers immediate, con-
crete, and probably irreparable harm. Black culture, by contrast, if 
harmed at all, suffers the minute and diffuse harm that results when a 
de minimis number of Black children are placed in white homes. 
Therefore, advancing cultural interests in the child-placement process 
compromises the interests of individual Black children and is not nec-
essary for Black cultural preservation. 
2. Defining Black Culture: Why Are Transracially Placed 
Children Less ''Black"? 
The NABSW is concerned that transracially placed Black children 
will be raised to have "white minds."207 As a corollary, there must be 
a distinct "Black mind." What this Black identity entails, however, is 
far from clear. Indeed, whether Black people comprise an identifiable 
cohesive culture or share a set of common values is questionable. To 
the extent that Black people do have common interests, why do trans-
racially placed Blacks not share such interests? 
Black people do not comprise a discrete culture.208 Rather, the 
Black community is diverse in terms of the practices and values of the 
people within it. Black people are spread across geographic and class 
lines. 209 Black people do not share a common language, a unifying 
religion, or a representative leadership.210 On significant social and 
political issues, such as transracial adoption, there is no consensus 
among Black people.211 As one commentator observes," '[e]ach black 
person responds differently to [her] socialization and experience in 
207. See supra note 205. 
208. Compare, for example, the Old Order Amish discussed in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 
205 (1972). The Supreme Court of the United States upheld the right of Amish parents to keep 
their children home after the eighth grade in violation of state law. The Court found that the law 
requiring the Amish to send their children to school beyond the eighth grade "carries with it a 
very real threat of undermining the Amish community and religious practice." 406 U.S. at 218. 
Black people may have a similar interest in cultural preservation and self·determination and thus 
may have a legitimate interest in having Black children placed within the Black community. The 
analogy, however, is flawed to the extent the Black community does not constitute a cohesive 
group with an identifiable leadership or identifiable interests, at least not to the extent of discrete 
groups such as the Amish. See Schneider, supra note 16, at 1397. The Amish in Yoder are 
homogenous in culture with an identifiable leadership. See id. Amish communities systemati-
cally resist influence from mainstream society and even divide themselves, over doctrinal dis-
putes, into separate communities. See id. Furthermore, Amish communities are geographically 
localized and homogenous in social class. See id. at 1398. 
209. See id. 
210. See id. at 1398; T. Gamer & D.L. Rubin, Middle Class Blacks' Perceptio11s of Dialect 
a11d Style Shifti11g: The Case of Southern Attorneys, 5 J. LANGUAGE & Soc. PSYCHOL. 33, 47 n. I 
(1986) ("The term[] 'Black English' ... [denotes a] fiction[]. There is no monolithic language 
variety typical of black Americans .... "). 
211. Bowen, supra note 7, at 501; Howard, supra note 2, at 531; O'Brien, supra note 11, at 
493. 
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terms of being black.' "212 
Despite this diversity, the NABSW, as if speaking for all Black 
people, charge that Blacks with white parents are less Black, indeed, 
that they are white. Such a position is consistent with other Black 
voices who seek to define the "correct" Black identity to the exclusion 
of others.213 The "white" Blacks often include those who strive for 
individual achievement and aspire to career positions traditionally re-
served for the dominant class. 214 These Black people, however, are 
not less Black and need not reject their racial heritage, although they 
often reject the "form of social fascism"215 by which other Blacks im-
pugn their racial identity as less than authentic simply because they 
seek lifestyles traditionally reserved for whites. Indeed, it is the atti-
tude on the part of some Blacks who call into question the Black iden-
tity of those who "make it" that is counterproductive to the condition 
of Black people.216 Being Black should not limit career aspirations or 
require a particular political viewpoint.217 Accordingly, Black chil-
dren placed with white parents, many of whom will join the ranks of 
the middle class, are Black nonetheless. 
As to biracial children raised by white parents, the NABSW posi-
212. Williams, supra note 133, at A26 (quoting Dr. Robert Carter, associate professor of 
psychology and elementary education at Columbia University). 
213. For example, in reaction to the televised nomination hearings of Justice Clarence 
Thomas, "[m]any blacks questioned the 'blackness' of a man who embraces a conservative phi-
losophy and is married to a white woman. To still others, his accuser, Anita F. Hill, a Jaw 
professor at the University of Oklahoma, failed the 'blackness' test by betraying another member 
of her race." Id. at Al. 
Stephen L. Carter, a professor of!aw at Yale University, writes that "[Blacks who ostracize 
other Blacks] really do believe that there is an important sense in which people of color who hold 
the wrong views have no right to call themselves people of color. They really do believe that the 
dissenters are traitors, Uncle Toms, merely biologically black, not bona fide representatives of 
their people." STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 131 
(1991). 
214. One 42-year-old Black attorney recounts how her success and upper-class lifestyle has, 
in the eyes of other Blacks, called her racial identity into question: " 'I've had black folks come 
up to me and say I'm not black because of the way I live[.] It hurts, but I don't argue. In my 
heart, I'm black." Williams, supra note 133, at 26. 
215. The term social fascism was used by Julius Lester, a professor of Judaic and African-
American Studies at the University of Massachusetts, when commenting on a 1988 incident in 
which members of the African-American Studies department, in which he was a member, sought 
his reassignment after he criticized novelist James Baldwin. Lester continued, "is black identity 
so problematic that one is to be judged as 'anti-Negro[]' for being critical of Baldwin or Jesse 
Jackson?" Id. (quoting Prof. Julius Lester). 
216. Cf. Gale, supra note 133, at 19 ("When the media insist[] upon equating the term 
'black' with what is less desirable, they are creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. . . . One's self 
expectations are drastically reduced."). 
217. See infra note 220 (quoting Prof. Lester). But see Williams, supra note 133 (quoting 
Roger Wilkins, a professor of history at George Mason University): 
Every oppressed community ... has drawn lines and says certain behavior puts you 
outside the community[.] For black Americans who Jive in a society where racism exists, it 
is legitimate to set parameters. In arguing how best we struggle, there is some political and 
intellectual behavior in which you engage that keeps you from being a black person. 
Id. at A26. 
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tion appears paradoxical. Although half-white, such children are 
black; at the same time, due to their "white" upbringing, such children 
are white. How does such a child, raised by at least one parent who is 
a racial "match," most likely her mother,218 simultaneously lose her 
whiteness on the outside and betray her blackness on the inside? It 
seems it is the NABSW position that creates the risk of racial confu-
sion for biracial children. 
The diversity of Black people's attitudes toward Black identity 
may be inevitable when the commonality of Black people primarily 
depends on a physical feature rather than adherence to a particular 
religious doctrine,219 political platform, or other agenda or interest. 
Whatever the reason, the claim that transracially placed Black chil-
dren do not have a Black identity is suspect. Indeed, such racial stere-
otyping is akin to that which led to the oppression of Black people.220 
In any event, the NABSW's efforts to define Blackness, an "essentially 
adult agenda of promoting racial separation,"221 has no place in the 
child-placement process. If, as this Note suggests, skin color is sepa-
rate from cultural affiliation, a black or biracial child placed in a white 
home can learn the culture of her white parents while maintaining a 
realistic and healthy view toward her racial identity. 
3. Benefits of Transracial Placement for Black People and Society 
Assuming Black people have a cohesive culture and assuming 
transracial placement has a significant influence on it, transracial 
placement does not necessarily harm Black culture. In fact, Black 
people, and American society as a whole, may benefit from transracial 
placement. Black people as a group may benefit from transracial 
placement in at least two respects: career success and social 
integration. 
Transracial placement may help Black people achieve career suc-
cess. Black-American culture has developed in a society that has de-
nied Black people educational and career opportunities. Deprived of 
these opportunities, Black people, as a group, are less experienced in 
meeting the challenges of school and the American marketplace. Fur-
thermore, in the face of majority oppression, Black people have reason 
218. In most interracial marriages, the father is Black and the mother is white. See Perry, 
supra note 2, at 61 n.32. 
219. See supra note 208 for the discussion of the Amish. 
220. In a telephone interview with Lena Williams of the New York Times, Lester stated that 
"[h]aving been involved in the civil rights movement, I didn't fight against whites trying to limit 
and define me to tum around and have blacks try to limit and define me." Williams, supra note 
133, at A26 (quoting Prof. Lester). 
221. Bartholet, supra note 6, at 1256. Professor Bartholet observes that "Black leaders in the 
adoption world originally promoted racial matching in the historical context of the black nation· 
alism movement that gained prominence in the latter part of the 1960s, with its calls for black 
power and black self-determination." Id. at 1233. 
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to reject the values represented in the dominant culture.222 Informed 
by this experience, Black culture may be less well suited to academic 
and career achievement in mainstream society. Transracial placement 
can aid in reversing this trend by creating opportunities for Black chil-
dren to learn the skills and values with which to achieve academic and 
career advancement. 
Transracial placement may also reduce racism by increasing un-
derstanding through integration. Transracial placement helps to 
bridge the gap between Black and white people and may reduce racial 
tension and the discriminatory obstacles to opportunities that Black 
people continue to encounter in American society.223 A Black child 
who is raised by white parents tends to be more understanding of 
white people and culture. A transracially placed child, and a biracial 
child in particular, is in the best position to see the commonality be-
tween Black and white people and the irrationality of racial barriers to 
communication, respect, and understanding.224 Similarly, by exposing 
white people to a Black child, transracial placement can increase the 
understanding and sensitivity of white people toward Blacks. By re-
ducing racial prejudice, Black people - including Black children -
have greater choice in what they pursue and accomplish and have less 
need for the coping skills argued for by the NABSW. 
Furthermore, Black people need not obtain these benefits at the 
expense of Black cultural preservation. The skills and values neces-
sary for individual achievement should be free from culture; a Black 
person who succeeds is still Black.225 As Black people attain greater 
222. See, e.g., Kool Moe Dee, White Supremacy Imposed False Values on Afrikans, L.A. 
TIMES, May 24, 1992, at M2 (advocating rejection of "a way of life that was imposed on us 
through slavery"). 
223. Howard observes: 
[B]oth white and non-white children raised in mixed-race families were less likely to have 
pro-white attitudes or to associate "white" with positive and desirable characteristics than 
were both white and non-white children generally. Thus, the practice of transracial adop-
tion attacked as destroying "psychosurvival skills" of black children may in itself contribute 
to such a change in attitudes that those skills become superfluous. 
Howard, supra note 2, at 540. 
224. In her doctoral research, Christine Kerwin studied racial identity development in bi-
racial school-age children. The majority of the subjects demonstrated an increased sensitivity to 
the views, values, and cultures of Black and white people, and tended to observe more similarities 
than differences between the two groups. Christine Kerwin, Racial Identity Development in 
Biracial Children of Black/White Racial Heritage (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ford-
ham University), abstracted in 52 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTL. No.7, at 2469-A (1992). 
225. Garner and Rubin conducted a series of in-depth interviews with several southern Black 
attorneys in order to understand how they were able to use Standard English (SE) without dis-
avowing their Black cultural identities. The subjects reported that they disassociated SE from 
cultural identification: 
Only two respondents even partially equated SE with the way whites spoke. The others 
thought there was no SE that was the predominant province of Italians, Irish, blacks or 
whites. Rather, SE usage identified the sophisticated and the educated, and an individual 
would use it to demonstrate that he or she was both .... 
. . . Since SE is not white English, and is rather an educated person's tool for survival, 
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achievement, Black culture can incorporate this experience and, by so 
doing, adapt to the challenges of modem America. Thus, with the 
help of transracial placement, Black culture can undo the effects of 
racial discrimination and not only survive, but flourish. 226 
Society also benefits by improving the condition of Black people. 
The productive participation of Black people in the economy promotes 
the prosperity of the United States. In addition, Black prosperity 
should reduce the societal burden of Black poverty and crime. More-
over, reducing racial tension should promote positive interracial rela-
tions whereby we can celebrate, rather than fear, cultural diversity. 
Thus, if interests other than those of the particular child are to 
enter child-placement decisions, courts and agencies should recognize 
that transracial placement may serve interests as legitimate for Black 
people as those purportedly served by same-race placement. In addi-
tion, transracial placement offers benefits for society as a whole. For 
these reasons, given the plausible and reported successes of transracial 
placements in contrast to the high costs of racial-matching policies in 
adoption proceedings227 and custody disputes,228 courts and agencies 
should not consider race when placing a black or biracial child. 
CONCLUSION 
States rightfully charge courts and placement agencies with safe-
guarding the best interests of the child. By engaging in racial match-
ing, however, courts and agencies cause serious harm to Black 
children. These children remain in institutional or foster care while 
white parents are available. The children become hard to place by 
virtue of their increased age and adjustment problems relating to the 
amount of time under state care. 
In the judicial process, courts tend to place excessive emphasis on 
race. The discretionary nature of the race factor also encourages 
harmful litigation over child custody and racial identity. If courts and 
agencies did not consider race in placing Black children, they would 
these professionals have found a way to maintain cultural identity while at the same time 
communicating credibility in the dominant culture. 
Garner & Rubin, supra note 210, at 46. 
In her doctoral research, Deborah Broadway studied the childrearing practices of Black mid· 
die-class families. The study found that the participating families raised their children to func· 
tion competently in middle-class white society while maintaining psychological and cultural ties 
to the Black community. Deborah C. Broadway, A Study of Middle Class Black Children and 
Their Families: Aspirations for Children, Perceptions of Success and the Role of Culture (1987) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University), abstracted in 48 DISSERTATION AB· 
STRACTS INTL. No.I at 42-A (1987). 
226. Recall that this assumes that transracial placements occur in sufficient numbers to affect 
Black culture. As discussed above, however, transracial placement is unlikely to have a signifi-
cant effect on Black culture. See supra section 111.D. I. 
227. See supra Part II. 
228. See supra section 11.B. 
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eliminate or greatly minimize these harms. Therefore, if courts and 
agencies are to protect the best interests of Black children, the consid-
eration of race is justifiable only if the risks of transracial placement 
outweigh the concrete harms of racial matching. As this Note has 
argued, however, transracial placement is an equally attractive alter-
native to inracial placement for black and biracial children, and race-
neutral placement is a far better alternative to the costs of racial 
matching. 
This Note has also considered the argument that the preservation 
of Black culture justifies racial matching. It is doubtful whether trans-
racial placement threatens Black culture and, even if it did, the best-
interests standard requires cultural interests to yield to the interests of 
the individual child in a child-placement proceeding. This Note has 
also argued that transracial adoptees are no less Black than other 
Black children. Finally, if transracial placement does affect the nature 
of Black culture, it may in fact contribute positively to the develop-
ment of Black people and Black culture. 
The use of race in the child-placement process may be well inten-
tioned, but such policies lack both empirical and reasoned justifica-
tion. Therefore, courts and agencies should ignore the race of a child 
when making placement decisions. Instead, courts and agencies 
should place Black children as soon as possible in the arms -
whatever color - of loving and capable parents. As one court recog-
nized, if these "children are raised in a happy and stable home, they 
will be able to cope with prejudice and hopefully learn that people are 
unique individuals who should be judged as such."229 
229. Lucas v. Kreischer, 299 A.2d 243, 246 (Pa. 1973) (quoting Judge Hoffman's unpub-
lished dissent). 
